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The Zimbabwe Defense Force faces a resource crisis that threatens capability to
fulfill its mission to defend Zimbabwe's national interests. At the same time the National
Defense Policy makes a commitment to modernize the force and the executive constantly
echoes this through policy statements at various forums. The Zimbabwean economy's
ability to sustain the modernization program is questionable given its failure to sustain
the force in a period of low-level activity.
This paper examines ZDFs budgetary process to assess the prospects of
reengineering it to meet the challenges of modernization in a constrained economy. A
detailed description of the current process is presented and analyzed against relevant
theory on policy analysis, reengineering, and contemporary budgeting systems, in
particular PPBS.
The analysis concludes that in addition to reengineering, major strategic changes
need to be made. In particular, inclusion of defense aspects in national development
planning, adoption of a program or mission budgeting system, institution of the strategic
planning process, evolution of an information technology strategy, and continuous
improvement in human resource management would be fundamental to improvement in
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Zimbabwe is currently undergoing a painful but necessary socio-economic
transformation. Erratic economic growth, high budget deficit, spiraling debt, double-digit
inflation, high interest rates, and rising unemployment are among the economic ills that
characterize the economy. Such is the case despite very promising national development
plans that have been proposed over the years.
In February 1981, the Government of Zimbabwe published its first policy
statement since independence in 1980. The statement, Growth with Equity, identified
government's main objective as that of achieving "a sustained high economic growth and
speedy development in order to raise the incomes and standards of living of all our
people and expand productive employment of rural peasants and urban workers,
especially the former". This has remained government's objective as successive policy
statements to date testify.
1
In spite of government's objectives, poor economic performance persisted and
some key economic targets were not met. These problems have been blamed on the
various factors including the weather, poor terms of trade and inappropriate monetary
and fiscal policies. Although there is no consensus on the extent to which each of the
above has contributed to the current situation, most of the blame tends to be laid on
Zimbabwe's largely expansionary fiscal policies, in particular the high budget deficit.
These problems have resulted in calls for government to reduce expenditure so as to
create conditions for economic growth without negating its commitment to improving the
general welfare of the population. The bureaucracy and the military are therefore major
targets for reduction in light of the "non-productive" and, with particular reference to the
military, the "discretionary" nature of their expenditures. The national budget, as a
mechanism for allocating the nation's scarce resources, can be manipulated to achieve
1
These subsequent policy statements were: Transitional National Development Plan (1982/83 to 1984/85),
Transitional National Development Plan (1985/86 to 1988/89), Frameworkfor Economic Reform (1991 to
1995), Zimbabwe Programfor Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST-1996 to 2000)
2 Zimbabwe is mainly an agro-based economy. Its GDP growth rate depends largely on the performance of
the agricultural sector. Poor rainfall in 1992 and 1995, for example, had a serious negative impact on the
economy.
this end. Achieving the right balance in the allocation of scarce resources among
competing national goals, however, poses the biggest challenge to policy-makers. It is in
this respect that the efficacy with which the budgetary process is crafted and executed can
make a significant contribution.
Within the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF), the budgetary process can also be
instrumental in mobilizing, allocating and managing resources efficiently. The budgetary
process in this case goes beyond the "simple" determination of how much will be
allocated to whom and for what purposes. As this thesis will argue, ZDF's experience of
the budgetary process has been limited, at least in practice, to this narrow view. There
was a conspicuous absence of innovative ideas and focused commitment to take on the
challenges that were posed by a deteriorating economic environment and the reduction in
real terms of the budget allocations for defense. Perhaps part of the blame for this
situation lies in ZDF's preoccupation with other pressing challenges such as transforming
a semi-professional to a professional force and operational duties. ZDF's background
discussed below will help to put some of its problems into perspective.
ZDF was formed at Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 when the former
Rhodesian Army was integrated with former guerilla armies (Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army). This resulted in the size
of the Army soaring from the existing Rhodesian Army strength of 15,000 to about
70,000. This phenomenal growth was to be sustained at the same level of resources, as
Government had to deal with other pressing welfare issues such as education and health.
The new ZDF had to contend with shortage of accommodation, barrack-room
equipment, motor vehicles, uniforms and other resources. Training, which was the major
focus during the integration process, also put a heavy strain on the now meager resources.
The inability to avail more resources to match the growth in demand meant that current
resources would decrease at an increasing rate. At the human resource level, training to
3 Zimbabwe (known as Rhodesia before independence) attained its independence from Britain on 1 8 April
1980 after a liberation war that lasted for about 14 years. While there was low activity between 1966 and
1971, the war intensified from 1972 until the 1979 when the cease-fire that was negotiated as part of the
independence settlement came into effect. The then Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, proclaimed a policy
of reconciliation that entailed among other things, power-sharing (although this was not a constitutional
requirement) and the formation of a "Zimbabwe National Army" from the former adversaries.
achieve the same professional standards among soldiers with varied military backgrounds
was intensified. The leadership had to transform from guerilla to professional military
leaders. The challenges that the leaders faced in mobilizing resources and managing
them efficiently were enormous, for this would affect the effectiveness with which the
military would play its role in safeguarding Zimbabwe's national security interests.
In line with this role, ZDF was to be engaged in internal security operations from
early 1982 to 1987. Despite the relatively small enemy force, the guerilla tactics it
employed called for extensive deployment and a disproportionately large commitment of
resources. Between 1985 and 1993, ZDF was engaged in operations in Mozambique to
safeguard Zimbabwe's communication lines to the Mozambican ports. ZDF has also been
participating in peacekeeping operations since 1991 to date. From its formation up to
about 1993, more emphasis was placed on operations and the provision of resources in
the short-term at the expense of building capacity for the future. Where long-term
procurement was made, questions of justification, transparency and accountability were
often raised. The requirement for efficiency and accountability in the management of
resources had, inadvertently or otherwise, been relegated to the "back stage".
Chronic resource problems are now manifesting themselves in the form of
shortage of the most basic requirements such as food and uniforms, and the termination
of utility services (lights, water, telephone services) due inadequacy of funds. Other
resources, such as vehicles for unit administration and operational duties, weapon
systems, unit and barrack-room equipment are either in short supply or out-dated, and in
some cases both in short supply and outdated. There is little evidence that over the years,
a strategy was being evolved to avert the deteriorating trend in military capability that
could seriously constrain ZDF's role in safeguarding Zimbabwe's national interests. If
there was one, then the current situation, which at best can be described as a crisis, proves
that such strategy has so far been ineffective. Only recently have steps been taken to
downsize the ZDF in an effort to avert the crisis.
Despite this situation, calls for reduction in defense spending are all the more
vociferous. Given these circumstances, the challenge to achieve ZDF modernization in
4 ZDF is made up of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Air Force ofZimbabwe (AFZ).
Integration of the forces was initially focused on the ZNA. The problems discussed in this part were
therefore most pronounced in the ZNA.
the near future is certainly an uphill task. This challenge requires ZDF to take a critical
look at its shortcomings in the areas of policy analysis and resource planning and
management in search of innovative ways to maximize efficiency. Such a review would
lay the groundwork for improving planning capacity; development of feasible, cost-
benefit justified programs; and improving management and operational processes.
The problems alluded to above are inextricably linked to the ZDF budgetary
process. This thesis argues that by improving the budgetary process, prospects for
achieving modernization are significantly enhanced. It is necessary therefore, to examine
the current budgetary process if meaningful suggestions are to be proposed. This thesis
will show that the current ZDF budgetary process has major shortcomings among which
are the following:
To a great extent it is not based on credible, rationally justified programs or
missions.
Budgeting is viewed as an end and not as a means to an end. Once funds are
appropriated, there is no deliberate effort to assess the efficiency with which
they are used.
Management of the budget focuses on structure rather than processes.
Attempts to improve the budgetary system are based on marginal, incremental
changes that have little impact on ZDF's capacity to achieve economy,
efficiency and effectiveness.
It will be argued that nothing short of a strategic approach and reengineering will
be required effectively deal with the problems ZDF currently faces. The thesis
contributes to efforts to resolve these problems by reviewing the entire the budgetary
process from a management perspective, and making suggestions for improvement.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to examine the ZDF budgetary process
and assess the prospects for reengineering it to meet the challenges of its modernization
goal.
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
This study is concerned with the entire budgetary process and for this purpose, the
budgetary process includes all activities necessary to effectively and efficiently mobilize,
allocate and manage resources.
A literature review on policy and economic aspects was conducted in order to
provide an appropriate frame of reference for discussing the current ZDF budgetary
process. The discussion on the current process was based on a review of organizational
literature, Zimbabwe government statutes, and the writer's experience. This was
complemented by surveys conducted among the key players in ZDF, and among
Zimbabwean legislators, and by interviews with subject matter experts. Information from
the above was analyzed to assess the prospects for reengineering the budgetary process.
A qualitative model based on a logistical process is presented to illustrate how
reengineering might contribute to efficiency improvement within the ZDF budgetary
process. A general analysis of the structure of the ZDF budget will also be made to
illustrate some of the problems in the process. Otherwise the study is descriptive in
nature, and for this reason, it sets a framework for anyone intending to conduct an in-
depth quantitative study of the ZDF budgetary process to focus detailed analysis
(including modeling) on specific issues identified as problematic.
Note should be taken, however, on the limitations of the study. Firstly, distance
made it difficult to obtain certain material, especially concerning budget reviews by the
Comptroller and Auditor General's (CAG) Department. For the same reason, it was not
possible to conduct face to face interviews that could, in some cases, have been more
appropriate. Administration of the survey also proved to be a big hurdle in that the
urgency attached to the study by agents was of less priority than that attached to it by the
author. However these shortcomings were not so significant as to render the conclusions
unsubstantiated.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remainder of this thesis is broken down into five chapters. Chapters II and III
give the theoretical foundations for this study based on literature review. Chapter IV
describes how the current system operates, and the analysis is given in Chapter V.
Conclusions and recommendations are then presented in Chapter VI.
Chapter II deals with policy aspects of defense budgeting. The defense policy
implications on the budgetary process are addressed first. This is followed by discussion
on the economic implications and the role of policy analysis. The chapter ends with the
development of budgeting systems including some lessons learnt from the
implementation of such systems.
Chapter III reviews theory of the "reengineering" process. First, the concept of
reengineering is defined to put it into perspective relative to other management
techniques for improving efficiency and instituting effective change in organizations. The
reengineering principles are discussed next, followed by the process itself. The final part
of the chapter then addresses the role of information technology, and reengineering in the
public sector.
Chapter IV reviews ZDF's current budgetary process. This includes Zimbabwe's
defense policy implications on the budget, government budgeting as a regulatory
framework, ZDF budgeting policy framework, budget formulation, negotiation,
appropriation, implementation, and review. Results of surveys are then presented to
complete the picture not only from a theoretical and documentary point of view, but from
a process practitioners' point ofview as well.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the discussion above. It seeks to identify
opportunities for reengineering the ZDF budgetary process and includes discussion on
policy and institutional improvements, selected process improvements, and a
reengineering approach to improvements model.
The final part of this thesis, Chapter VI, presents the conclusions and
recommendations.
II. POLICY ASPECTS OF DEFENSE BUDGETING
A. DEFENSE POLICY IMPLICATIONS ON THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
The foundation of all nations is based upon national values, those most cherished
principles upon which the existence of states are based. These national values form the
basis of national interests which states will use all their might to safeguard. Arlinghaus
and Barker posit that "all sovereign states have four fundamental national interests in
common; survival, territorial integrity, maintenance and enhancement of economic
wellbeing, and the promotion of a favorable world order". 5
National security policy is developed to promote and safeguard the national
interests from perceived threats, whether internal or external. National security therefore,
is concerned not only with the state's ability to use or threaten the use of physical force,
but with its ability, for example, to provide food to all its citizens (i.e. food security). The
state's national security strategy will therefore comprise a number of specific security
objectives, including defense policy objectives.
Defense policy, as G. M. Dillon observes, "plays an influential role in
constructing and reconstructing the political community by mediating its internal as well
as its external relations through the threat and use of force". 6 The state is able to bargain
in the international arena because it can back its demands by the threat or use of force, be
it offensively or defensively. Likewise, in the domestic arena, the state's monopoly over
the legitimate use of force enables it to maintain order while carrying out functions for
the wellbeing of its members.
The above would hold true if the military is perceived as being in fact capable of
exercising such force. The military's capability is therefore critical for it to play its
appropriate role, particularly in the competitive regional and international arena.
Readiness, modernization, force structure, and sustainability are considered to be the four
"pillars" of military capability.
5
Keith A Dunn and William O Staudenmaier, Strategy for Survival Foreign Policy 52 (Fall 1983) 22-40.
Cited in African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities (Westview Press, 1 986) ed. Bruce E. Arlinghaus and
Pauline H. Barker, 3.
6
G. M. Dillon, Defense Policy Making: A Comparative Analysis (Leicester University Press, 1988) 1.
7
Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1995) 37. According to the Government Accounting Office Report B-2 17229 dated May 1990,
1. Readiness
Readiness may be viewed as the immediate ability of the military forces to
execute their combat missions. The military forces include manpower, units, then-
weapon systems and equipment. Of note is the fact that readiness involves both speed
(how soon a force is capable to respond to a threat) and effectiveness.
Betts criticizes the "official definition" that tends to emphasize on the speed
factor, and he correctly observes that "unless it can ensure that the battle is decided on the
first day, a force that could fight spectacularly for one day but would collapse on the
second is no more ready in any meaningful sense than is one that could not fight as well
o
but could fight longer".
On the other hand, a force that cannot accomplish its combat mission (i.e. lacks
effectiveness) regardless of the speed with which it can deploy cannot be considered to be
ready. Combat effectiveness is a product of mass and efficiency, where mass is "the
basic organized capital stock, human and technical, of a military force", and efficiency "is
the degree to which units can realize their maximum potential performance".9
From the above it may be noted that readiness is inseparable from the other three
"pillars", modernization, force structure and sustainability. These are defined below.
2. Modernization
Modernization refers to the sophistication of the forces' equipment and weapon
systems. This invariably involves procurement ofnew equipment and weapon systems or
modification of existing ones. It also calls for "modernization" of the manpower that is
supposed to operate and service the enhanced weapon systems and equipment.
Modernization also involves improvement in management systems associated
with the new or modified weapon systems and equipment, and attention needs to be paid
to such aspects as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis programming,
budgeting, procurement, financial management, information technology etc. It may also
be necessary to extend the modernization beyond the military to include improvement of
DoD defines military capability as the ability of the force to achieve a war-time objective such as winning a





local industrial capacity to produce defense goods, as long as this would be efficient in
meeting national security objectives.
3. Force Structure
Force structure refers to the numbers, size and composition of the units
constituting the military forces. This is determined by, among other things, the concept
of operations determined from analysis of the threat, weapon systems and equipment to
be employed, reserve and mobilization capability, and capacity to fund the adopted
structure.
There is also need to achieve the right balance between operational and
supporting service units/personnel. Effectiveness is compromised where for example, in
the process of downsizing, the military focuses on retention of operational units at the
expense of service support. Some essentially "non-military" roles (e.g. Pay-roll
administration) could also be "civilianized" to achieve savings without sacrificing
service.
4. Sustainability
Sustainability is the capacity to maintain the military forces performing combat
missions over a long period of time. This calls for a sound logistical system, also
modernized in terms of equipment, information technology/systems, inventory
management techniques, framing and other management systems.
Existence of shortages to meet general and training requirements and war reserves
seriously curtails the readiness of the military force and its ability to withstand an
adversary in prolonged conflict. Capacity to sustain the military force cannot be achieved
efficiently (if at all) within a short time, let alone during a period of conflict escalation.
5. Link Between Defense Policy and the Budget
A nation's capacity to meet defense policy objectives depends, to a large extent,
on its ability to fund defense programs such as acquisition of weapon systems and
equipment, training, and operational missions. Low investment in such programs might
lead to failure to achieve the capability to meet those objectives. On the other hand, too
high an investment might be harmful to the economy and would therefore militate against
achievement of other national security goals (e.g. economic wellbeing).
An optimal defense policy therefore, requires consideration of the cost of meeting
objectives. These cost go beyond that of procuring materiel and includes the cost of the
various processes and outcomes that contribute to overall military capability.
Funding the defense budget is required both for local and foreign procurement.
Countries without significant defense industries rely mostly on imports for their
equipment and weapon systems. Sub-Saharan Africa is a case in point. 10 Defense
policies normally address these issues which have a bearing on whether objectives will be
met through local resources, foreign currency reserves or foreign aid.
At he local level it is important for defense forces to implement efficient
management policies and systems to ensure that defense policy goals are, as far as is
possible, met. The defense policy formulation process should also result in objectives
that are not overstated in terms of the nation's economic capacity. This highlights the
need to consider economic and policy implications of the budgetary process.
B. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY ANALYSIS
1. Economic Aspects of the Defense Budget
Defense expenditure is often a target for critics of governments' fiscal policies. It
is there for necessary to understand the reasons for such concerns. This section discusses
the "public good" nature of defense expenditure and its impact on economic growth.
a. Defense as a Public Good
One of the problems associated with allocating resources to defense is its
"public good" nature. By definition, public goods are commodities or services that are
consumed jointly. When provided to a single member of a community they are also
made available to all others. 11 The problem that arises is; who is willing to pay for a
good that will be consumed by all others? After all the utility of the good is different for
different people.
By providing the good to one person, it is impossible to prevent those who
are unwilling to pay for it from enjoying its benefits. As a result the market system
cannot lead to optimal production of national defense even if it is in society's interest to
10
South Africa, however is the only country in the region with a well developed defense industry.
11 Gwartney, James D. et.al. Macroeconomics: Private and Public Choice The Dryden Press, (Florida,
1995)98.
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have the service provided. Given the conflict between self- interest and the public
interest of economic efficiency that these arguments present, government has to intervene
and provide the public goods. The amount that government would be willing to pay for a
particular public good like defense will depend on a number of competing goals within its
overall national security strategy. The impact of defense expenditure on economic
growth is particularly pertinent in determining the level of defense expenditures.
b. Impact ofDefense Expenditure on Economic Growth
Following on from the "guns and butter" analogies, conventional wisdom
has it that military expenditure is harmful to the economy as it consumes resources that
could otherwise be used in the productive sector and in enhancing human capital. Since
the end of the cold war, the "peace dividend" advocates in particular, have been
reinforcing this argument. There is no general consensus, however, on whether defense
expenditure has a positive or negative impact on the economy, and this bears testimony to
the complexity of the subject. This section summarizes some of the major arguments that
have been made on the subject
One of the major arguments that have been advanced against defense
expenditure is the crowding out effect. Within the government budget itself, defense
competes with other government programs such as health and education. A more than
proportionate increase in defense spending may lead to a relative reduction in other
programs. In the absence of additional revenue, the alternative for financing such
expenditure would be borrowing either from the foreign or domestic market. Local
borrowing leads government to compete with the private sector for scarce financial
resources from the money market. This results in the "crowding out" of the private
sector, and money that would otherwise be used for investment is used for public
consumption. In a study of 50 least developed countries, Deger concluded that "an
increase in the defense burden leads to a decrease in the growth rate through decline in
the saving rate, a fall in investment per unit of capital, and a fall in human capital
1 "X
formation".
12 Olvey Lee D. The Economics of National Security Avery Publishing Group (New York, 1984) 9-10.
13
Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: The Economic Effects (London, Boston
and Henley: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1986) 244-245.
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Looney argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, recent empirical
research on third world economies suggests that under certain circumstances, increased
levels of defense expenditure can enhance economic growth. 14 He makes reference to
other scholars, (Benoit, and R Faini, P. Annez and L. Taylor) who among others, have
shown that defense expenditure may actually stimulate growth by increasing aggregate
demand, and this additional demand translates into more production by the private sector,
and lower unemployment among other benefits.
Benoit also argues that defense programs of most countries make tangible
contributions to the civilian economies as follows: 15
Feeding, clothing and housing a number of people who would otherwise have
been fed, clothed and housed by the civilian economy.
Providing education and medical care as well as vocational and technical
training that may have high civilian utility.
Engaging in a variety of public works.
Engaging in technical and scientific specialties and defusing such skills to the
civilian economy.
Deger lends support to this argument by showing that "there are direct and
indirect ways in which high defense expenditure may have spin-off effects on
employment and the creation of human capital". 16 Yet another study by
Kohler showed that a well-equipped and trained army in the African context
could induce additional investment through its security enhancing effects. 17
In the final analysis, economic considerations cannot be the sole basis
upon which the level of defense expenditure is based. Each country's national security
strategy based on perceived threats will be a major determinant. This argument
notwithstanding, the need to ensure efficiency in defense programs through the use of
economic and other analyses cannot be over emphasized.
14







Looney, 1 12. He refers to Daniel F Kohler, The Effects of Defense and Security on Capital Formation in
Africa: An Empirical Investigation (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, September 1988)
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2. Policy Analysis and Evaluation
The debate on the impact of defense expenditure on the economy underscores the
need to ensure that defense related public policy analysis affords the decision-makers an
opportunity to make efficiency maximizing decisions. The capacity to evaluate the
policies is important in determining the extent to which particular policies or programs
are implemented based on stated guidelines, and whether policies cause change in the
intended direction. Policy analysis and evaluation are critical not only at the national
level but at sub-national levels as well.
By definition, public policy analysis "is a systematic approach to making policy
choices in the public sector. It is a process that generates information on the
consequences that might be expected to follow the adoption of various policies. Its
purpose is to assist policymakers in choosing a preferred course of action from among
complex alternatives under uncertain conditions". 19 When applied to defense, the effect
of such analyses is likely to have a significant impact on the stakeholders' perceptions
about the value of defense expenditure and may influence how national resources are
allocated in the future.
Howard E Freeman defined comprehensive policy evaluation as evaluation in
which "appropriate techniques and ideas have been brought to bear so that it is possible to
determine whether or not a program, intervention or treatment is carried out as planned,
and to assess whether or not the program resulted in changes or modifications consistent
with the intended outcomes". The intended outcomes of both policy analysis and
evaluation are the same. For the purpose of avoiding redundancy, further discussion
below will refer mostly to policy analysis, and this may be used interchangeably with
policy evaluation.
a. Rationalefor Policy Analysis
Weimer and Vining set out two broad categories of rationale for public
policy, namely: Market failures to improve efficiency in the production and allocation of
18
See Nachmias, David Public Policy Evaluation (St Martin's Press: New York, 1979) for a discussion on
process and impact evaluation, also known as comprehensive evaluation.
19 Warren E. Walker and Gene H Fisher, "Public Policy Analysis" Encyclopedia of Operations Research
and Management Science ed. Saul I. Gass and Carl M Harris, (Boston, Dordrecht and London: Kluwer




resources and goods, and the reallocation of opportunity and goods to achieve
distributional and other values.21 The nature of public goods provides discrepancies in
which Pareto efficiency cannot be achieved. Public policy then intervenes to "correct"
the discrepancies so as to achieve efficiency.
Policy analysis may be used for a variety of purposes among which are: as
an aid to decision-making, to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of policy, and as a
problem assessment and monitoring tool. The most common use of policy analysis is
as a decision-making aid.
According to Bozeman, "the decision tool variety of policy analysis is
generally the most stylized and rigorous application of policy analysis and includes
techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, public choice modeling, operations research,
simulation, gaming, and other techniques generally rooted in mathematics".23 Such
analysis is usually best suited to situations where, among other things, the problem can be
stated unequivocally, variables are conveniently quantifiable, value of costs and benefits
over time can be determined, and there is a function to be maximized or minimized. The
difficulty of ascertaining relevant values however, has often been used as excuse for
preferring intuitive rather than quantitative policy analysis.
Evaluating the impacts of policy is yet another important use of policy
analysis. One approach to such evaluation is to use the same techniques used in arriving
at the decisions, but using the actual data. Economic approaches such as the cost-benefit
analysis are particularly useful in determining indirect impacts in unintended
consequences. Another useful approach is program evaluation, which is mostly based on
experimental or quasi-experimental design. Program evaluation seeks to replace the
impressionistic approach with one based on scientific approach.
As an assessment and monitoring device, policy analysis helps to establish
benchmarks and critical indicators. Benchmarking enables the organization to compare
its output with organizations doing similar things. For example, output in a government
vehicle workshop may be compared to an International Standards Organization certified
21
David L. Weimer, and Aidan R. Vining Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice (New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1992)30-111.
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vehicle workshop in the private sector. By establishing critical indicators, the
organization will be prompted to make timely intervention and so avoid failure in
meeting its goals.
Despite the importance of policy analysis as confirmed by its "universal"
acceptance in public organizations, it sometimes fails to achieve the intended results.
This is the case particularly when it is used to provide "evidence" for decisions that
would already have been made, or for "shooting down" programs that would have fallen
into political disfavor.
24
Policy analysis also fails for political reasons, and due to lack of
capacity for conducting or interpreting it. At the political level, "higher interests" (e.g.
national) may be subordinated to "lower interests" (e.g. organizational, class, and self-
interests) to the extent that excuses are given for ignoring results of such analyses, or for
not conducting the analyses in the first place. The fact that policy analysis is only an aid
in the decision-making process also provides opportunity for making sub-optimal
choices. These limitations may be mitigated where organizational leadership is
committed to adopt such programs to improve efficiency in resource planning and
management. Such commitment can only result in positive outcomes provided the
organization has the capacity to conduct effective policy analysis and evaluation.
Development of such capacity is discussed below.
b. Developing Capacity
Organizations may choose to have in-house policy analysts, to rely on
consultants, or to rely on a mix of the two. The option selected will have a bearing on
policy analysis skill requirements. There is also need to avail data and other resources
that are critical to any effective policy analysis. In the final analysis, leadership must be
focussed and committed to the tenets of efficiency and effectiveness.
Generally there are two skill levels that are relevant to effective policy
analysis: the skill to comprehend analysis already conducted, and the skill to conduct the
analysis. The first skill level is required for all staff responsible for making policy




Policy analysis is recognized as an emerging "profession" and many public organizations now have
positions titled "policy analyst". Some policy analyst positions were referred to as economists, program
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lack of an organizational framework that fosters rational analysis. The second skill level
would be typical of consultants, but where an organization is committed to policy
analysis without the resources to rely on consultants, employing staff to work as analysts
may develop in-house capacity. The size of the organization and the complexity of
problems that have to be dealt with, have to be considered when determining the
organizational framework for policy analysis. Whatever framework is adopted, no policy
analysis can be effectively conducted without good data.
Downs and Larkey observed that "in spite of enormous volumes of data
they generate each year, governments have a very incomplete, distorted, and often
unusable record of their past activities. The data required to get a start on learning what
causes what, or on forecasting the consequences of various actions do not often exist."26
Among the reasons they attribute the poor information base is the fact that little priority
and inadequate resources are given to collecting and storing data.
Provision of resources for policy analysts is another area that needs
attention. In addition to manpower and data related constraints, resources such as
information technology can assist to speed up the analysis process, and may in some
cases prove to be indispensable. The problem that has to be overcome in ensuring
efficiency improvement is, as Downs and Larkey contend, that "government has no
resources to save resources".
c. Implicationsfor Resource Planning andManagement Policies
Few organizations, if any, can boast of an unconstrained resource base.
Governments in particular are under constant pressure to cut their budgets due to scarcity
of resources. The different levels of budget allocations to various programs represent
policy statements about national values and perceived efficient allocation of national
resources. It is important therefore, for government to adopt measures that enhance
capacity for conducting policy analysis to ensure that resource allocation is consistent
with national values and interests.
evaluators, budget analysts, statisticians, operations researchers etc. There are also professional bodies
such as the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management that regulate the profession.
26 Downs, George W and Larkey, Patrick D The Search for Government Efficiency (Temple University
Press: Philadelphia, 1986) 1 st ed. 243.
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The same analogy applies at department (e.g. defense) level. Important
messages can be communicated through budgets and other management systems put in
place to achieve efficient management of resources. The continual development of
budgeting systems may be viewed as a quest to achieve that end.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF BUDGETING SYSTEMS
The evolution of budgetary systems has generally followed a trend from being
based on political/incremental decision-making, to decision making based on systematic
analysis and planning. In general government budgetary systems are complex and
fragmented. Perhaps this may be explained by the fact that as budgeting systems evolved
over the years, governments have tended to adopt only those elements of the new system
that are consistent with their individual goals.
Some key features of different budgeting systems are discussed below. The
Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is discussed in more detail to
highlight application of policy issues and provide a basis for comparison with the ZDF
budgeting system.
1. Traditional/Incremental Budgeting
Incremental budgeting is a system that uses the previous budget as the basis for
determining the current one. Incremental changes are made to the previous budget to
take account of such things as new programs and changing priorities. Aaron Wildavsky
suggests that incremental budgeting is based on the concepts of base and fair share}1
The base represents those programs that all participants consider legitimate for the
respective departments, and which do not therefore need intensive scrutiny. On the other
hand,^7z> share "reflects a convergence of expectations on roughly how much an agency
is to receive in comparison to others".
The merit of this approach is that it simplifies calculation. Calculation, according
to Wildavsky, involves a study of how problems arise and are identified; how they are
broken down to manageable dimensions; how they relate to one another; how
11
Wildavsky, Aaron B. The New Politics of the Budgetary Process (Addison-Wesley Educational
Publishers Inc. 1997)45-53. See also Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes (Little,
Brown and Company Inc. Canada 1975) 5-9.
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Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) involves a review of all programs considered for
funding. Even continuing multi-year programs are subject to review and further
justification in light of prevailing circumstances. The fact that a program has been
authorized by statute is also not prima facie justification for automatic funding.
Premchand summarized the major features ofZBB as follows:
Programs are evaluated at different levels of resource allocation and
performance. Such levels may be categorized as "minimum, intermediate,
current, and enhancement".
Objectives are formulated for each agency.
Activities of each agency are converted into decision packages (or program
categories) which are developed to show performance at various resource
levels.
Decision packages are then evaluated and arranged at each level of
management by ranking order.
Line or management officials have a role in budget making, ranking of
programs etc. consistent with the MBO approach.
As noted by Premchand, the strength of ZBB lies in its giving equal attention to
the base as well as increments to the base, and it takes into account the changing levels of
resource availability.
3. Performance Budgeting
Performance budgeting arose from the realization of the shortcomings of the
accounting and control approach to budgeting. This approach enabled the bureaucracy to
keep track of where the funds were allocated and how they were spent, but it did not
account for efficiency in the budgetary process itself. Concern thus shifted to managerial
efficiency of the budget process.
28
Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process , 43.
29
A. Premchand Government Budgeting And Expenditure Controls: Theory and Practice (Washington DC:
International Monetary Fund, 1983) 335.
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When recommending the adoption of performance budgeting, the Hoover
Commission report noted that "such an approach would focus attention upon the general
character and relative importance of the work to be done, or upon the service to be
rendered, rather than upon things to be acquired, such as personal services, supplies,
equipment, and so on". Emphasis was laid more on activities performed rather than
inputs in order to help the administrators evaluate the work efficiency of operational
units. Downs and Larkey give an example of how this might apply to the postal service.
Major categories of the budget structure might change from personnel, equipment, capital
projects etc, to mail pickup, mail processing, mail delivery etc. Efficiency data within
each of these categories would then be presented to determine efficiency levels expected
3 1
e.g. number of letters sorted per employee-hour or cost of delivery per package.
Performance budgeting, it was hoped, would instill an efficiency focus in the
policy makers, and that it would be possible to monitor efficiency across agencies on the
assumption that efficiency was a function of agency effort. Difficulties were, however,
encountered in formulating the productivity or efficiency index. The system also
exposed the bureaucrats to criticism if they failed to meet performance criteria, hence
their resentment of the system. The process also required professional staff such as
economists and statisticians, and information systems that would enable the technocrats
to quantify their agency productivity goals.
At the budgeting level no dramatic benefits were derived from the new system.
Administrators, however, had recognized the need for and begun to implement
management procedures that would assist in the efficient management of public
resources.
4. Planning Programming and Budgeting System
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) originated from a
project that was instituted to advise the US Air Force about research development and
jo
planning. While PPBS was initially conceived as a US Department of Defense (DoD)
system, other government departments later adopted it with varying degrees of success.
30 Downs, George W and Larkey, Patrick D The Search for Government Efficiency (Temple University




Its aim was "to specify and (if possible) to quantify the objectives of spending programs,
to determine whether the benefits of a program are likely to exceed the costs, and to
minimize the net costs of achieving the specified objectives." 33
a. The Fundamentals ofPPBS
According to Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith, six basic ideas motivated
the PPBS "experiment" and they are given below. 34
The need to develop criteria for assessing defense needs and evaluate the
adequacy of existing programs.
The need for top decision-makers to base their decisions on rationally
developed alternatives.
The need for evaluating needs and costs together.
The need for commitment to financial planning.
The need for analysis and analytic staff to play a major role in directing the
budgetary choices.
The need for analysis to be open and explicit.
The above ideas recognized the need to develop a system where decisions
would be based on a rational analysis of policy choices, and where planning provided for
better coordination. This would enhance the capacity to manage scarce resources
effectively and, more importantly, the organization would be better placed to make
optimal contribution to national security goals.
At the operational level PPBS, contained five elements: 1) A program
structure in terms of missions, forces, and weapon and support systems. 2) The analytical
comparisons of alternatives. 3) A continually updated force structure and financial
program. 4) Related year-round decision making on new programs. 5) Progress
reporting to test the validity and administration of the plan.35
Bozeman outlines the basic steps in PPBS. The first step in implementing
PPBS is the grouping of activities into " program packages". These in turn are broken
32
Ibid 151. This project was spearheaded by Rand Corporation, an organization that had been created in
1 946 to bring together former wartime analysts to advise the Air Force.
33
Bozeman, Barry Public Management and Policy Analysis (St Martin's Press: New York, 1979) 233.
34 Downs and Larkey make reference to two analysts who held positions in both RAND and the Defense
Department.
35
Bozeman, 153. Cites Novick, 1965, p 89.
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down into "programs" which consist of "elements". The second step is to develop a
measure of output and effectiveness, and in the third step, costs and benefits are analyzed
and the program elements with the lowest net costs identified. He further identifies
"three types of documents central to the budget under PPB". These are; program
memorandum, program and financial plan, and analytic studies. The program
memorandum states the goals of the agency, and the rationale for its activities. The
program and financial plan provides data on projections of costs and output for each
program for a five-year period. The analytic studies provide the policy analysis base of
PPB.
Critics of this system contend that the volume of paper work generated by
PPBS "suffocated" the system. This made the budget process itself costly in terms of
effort required relative the commitment of the decision makers, in particular at the
political level. The system did not achieve as much success in government agencies as it
did in the military. Larry Jones and Glenn Bixler argue that "perhaps the reason why
PPBS has served the policy development and planning needs of DoD resource decision-
making while it floundered in other federal agencies is that the process was developed
specifically for defense, where many program and budget decisions are made on the basis
of assessing alternatives and where quantitative data are available and amenable to the
application of the tools of economic cost/benefit analysis, operations research, and other
sophisticated analytical methodologies". The review of the application ofPPBS in DoD
that follows will help to set the comparative framework for further discussion on
reengineering the ZDF budget.
Thomas A Simcik provides a detailed description of how PPBS operates
in the DoD in general, and in the Navy in particular.38 This section summarizes the key
elements he identifies in the process, and draws on other literature as indicated. A PPBS
overview is discussed followed by discussion on the three major phases in the process;
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38 Thomas A Simcik, Reengineering the Navy Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Process Thesis
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b. Overview
PPBS was implemented to improve the decision-making process in the
planning, allocation and management of resources. The system is objective driven and
seeks to provide optimal strategies for meeting those objectives. From the national
security objectives, a strategy to meet those objectives is developed. Requirements are
then estimated and programs developed to meet that strategy. Finally, budgets are
formulated to meet the costs of approved programs.
c. The Planning Phase
Four major strategy steps are identified and these are:
Identification of national interests.
Examination of the world security environment.
Defining the national military strategy.
Planning force structure.
National security interests are articulated at the executive level following
input from various stakeholders. These national security interests form the basis of the
national security strategy, and the president is required by statute to promulgate such
strategy. The national security strategy spells out, among other things, the executive's
political, economic and defense strategies.
Examination of the world security environment is done as part of an
assessment of short, medium and long-term threats to national security interests. Foreign
policy commitment to international treaties and alliances (e.g. NATO) and defense policy
objectives are major considerations in this assessment.
In defining the national military strategy, a four-step process is followed
as follows:
Ideal force level is determined assuming the absence of resource constraints.
Pragmatic resource constraints are then applied.
Optimal force level under those constraints is determined.
Risk is assessed and strategy is adjusted as necessary.
The process is undertaken to ensure that defense policy objectives are met.
9
This is required in terms of Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization
Act.
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Planning of force structure provides the basis for the programming phase.
The planning decisions are documented in the form of guidance and provide staff with
the framework for determining the allocation of resources.
The culmination of the planning phase is production of the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG, which is issued to the services by the Secretary of
Defense, covers "threats and opportunities, policy, strategy, force planning, resource
planning, and fiscal guidance, and includes a summary of major policy issues".40 An
important feature of the planning process is that there is a high level of consultation such
that when the services receive the DPG, their input would have been taken into account.
The DPG facilitates subsequent programming and budgeting activities within the
services.
d. The Programming Phase
The programming phase translates the DPG into program packages that
are presented in the form of multi-year financial plans. Each service is responsible for
developing its own programs in a process that typically involves program planning and
appraisal, program development, and program decision and appeals. The culmination of
the programming phase is the production of Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
The POMs are biennial recommendations made by the services to the
Secretary of Defense, and they include programs planned for a six-year period. Each
intervening year is used to review and update the POMs, while the last four years are
used as a starting point for updating the next POM after taking into account new
initiatives and planning guidance. POMs are scrutinized at joint-staff level and merged
into the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). The JPAM is then analyzed
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff before submission for program
decisions to the Defense Planning Resource Board (DPRB) which is chaired by the
Secretary of Defense. 41 The DPRB decisions are issued in the form of Program Decision
Memoranda (PDM), and these provide the basis for the budgeting phase.
40
L. R. Jones and G. C. Bixler, 21.
41 Such boards are also effective at the service level, for example the Navy has a "Resources and
Requirements Review Board" and when the Board sits to consider both Navy and Marine Corps programs,
it is the "Integrated Resources and Requirements Board".
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e. The Budgeting Phase
The programs invariably result in demands for more financial resources
than can be made available. The budgeting phase therefore seeks to ration the limited
financial resources across and within military departments in line with planning and
programming decisions.
In the case of the Navy, the Budget Guidance Manual (BGM) and other
issue-specific memoranda and notices guide the budget formulation process. The Budget
Submitting Offices (BSOs) submit their estimates for internal review by Navy
Comptroller budget analysts. The budget analysts conduct hearings to gain more
understanding of the budgets they are reviewing, and they examine the estimates
submitted to ensure that they conform to recent guidance and do not put the resources at
risk.
Budgets for all services are submitted for joint review by OSD and Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) staff. 42 The Secretary of Defense then conducts
hearings in conjunction with OSD and OMB staff, and he formulates his Program Budget
Decisions (PBD) and Defense Management Report Decisions (DMRD). PBDs provide
alternatives to service proposals while DMRDs seek to achieve economies and
efficiencies though improved business practices, consolidation of efforts and improved
management practices.
5. Management by Objectives
The adoption of the management by objectives (MBO) concept in budgeting is an
extension of the normal management functions of planning and control. MBO is believed
to have been widely used in the private sector from as far back as 1954.43 Chester
Newland identified the following as the key elements ofMBO:44
Setting goals, objectives, and priorities in terms of results to be accomplished
in a given time.
Developing plans for the accomplishment of results.
42 OMB is the organization in the President's office tasked with advising the president on budget related
issues and, under his direction, compiling the budget that will be submitted to Congress.
43A leading management theorist, Peter Drucker, introduced the concept ofManagement by Objectives
(MBO) as far back as 1954.
^Chester Newland, MBO Concepts in the Federal Government The Bureaucrat, 2, 4 (Winter 1974) 354-
361, in Bozeman, 234-235.
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Allocating resources in terms of established goals, objectives and priorities.
Involving people in implementation of plans, with emphasis on
communication for responsiveness and on broad sharing in authoritative goals
and objectives.
Tracking and monitoring of progress towards goals and objectives, with
specific intermediate milestones.
Evaluating results in terms of effectiveness (including quality), efficiency and
economy.
Generating and implementing improvements in objectives and results,
(increasing productivity through improved technology, better utilization of
technology etc.).
Bozeman notes that the chief distinction between MBO and PPB is the relative
flexibility of the two techniques. MBO can be used in conjunction with any other
techniques (e.g. cost-benefit analysis) and can be structured in any number of ways
according to the needs and constraints of the organization. It is however, primarily a
management technique that can be adapted for the budgeting role. For these reasons
therefore, MBO is does not impose across departments, as serious an obligation on
systems analysis as does PPB.
6. Lessons from Implementation of Budget Reforms
Premchand's study of selected industrial and developing countries provides some
important lessons on the implementation and evaluation of budget innovations. 45 He
makes some general observations discussed below.
No single system can be said to be in operation in any one country. If anything,
countries operate "a family of systems" in which selected features from different systems
are applied given their relevance and feasibility. There are, however, several common
features in the systems adopted and these include classification of activities (or
programs), specification of objectives, and evaluation of efficiency.
Implementation of budget reforms has generally been difficult and in some cases
half-hearted. The problems in most developing countries in particular, "cannot be
45
See Premchand's detailed comparative analysis covering the following countries: United States of
America, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Sweden, Tanzania, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines and Sri
Lanka. He also includes the United Nations in his study.
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disassociated with the plethora of problems associated with extensive needs and low
capacities... (and these include) lack of training facilities, shortage of skilled workers,
inadequate phasing, disillusionment with excessive paper-work, non-utilization of the
information generated, utilization of the information for strengthening centralized
controls, lack of adequate involvement of spending agencies, lack of proper hybridization
of some techniques" and over-ambitiousness. The lag in the implementation of reforms
in relation to other supplementary systems such as accounting and reporting also negates
the benefits of reform.
In the final analysis, Premchand observes that the complex nature of public
management problems could hardly be solved by the traditional budgeting system. While
budget innovations do not provide the panacea to such problems, they at least offer viable
alternatives to current systems that are responsive to the dynamic challenges faced by
both public and private sector organizations.
As highlighted above, implementation of reforms is fraught with difficulties.
Various management techniques to deal with reforms in the quest for improved efficiency
and productivity are evolving. These techniques take a holistic approach due to the
realization of potential benefits from integration of subsystems. One such management
technique, reengineering, is attracting considerable attention because of breakthroughs it
has resulted in for some private and public sector organizations. Because of its potential
for making organizations realize "dramatic improvements", reengineering is discussed in




The rapidly changing economic environment has forced most organizations to
revisit the way they conduct business. For the private sector concern has mainly been on
the need to survive in the face of fierce competition. As Hammer and Champy note, "the
three Cs - Customers, Competition and Change - have created a new world of
business."
46 The public sector, on the other hand, faces mounting pressure to reduce its
expenditure and so reduce the deficits that characterize most of national economies. The
bottom line is that all organizations are concerned with issues of optimizing efficiency by
ensuring that their processes enable them to satisfy their customers at the least possible
costs. Processes that do not add value are being eliminated.
Literature abounds on programs that organizations embark on in order to realize
their goal of staying ahead of the competition. These include restructuring, downsizing,
rationalization of operations, de-layering, total quality management (TQM), reinvention,
and reengineering among others. The most recent concept to attract much attention is
"reengineering". Michael Hammer pioneered the concept in 1990 when he presented a
paper entitled Reengineering Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate. 4 He championed the
concept through further research and publications with James Champy and Steven A.
Stanton.
48 The critical role that management plays in reengineering prompted him to
publish Reengineering Management. 49
The classical management scholars (the likes of Adam Smith and Frederick
Taylor) championed the concept of breaking-down work into simple tasks in order to
achieve specialization and hence improve productivity. Reengineering involves
arranging these tasks into coherent processes each of which adds value to the
organization while taking into account behavioral aspects.
The arguments presented by Hammer and his co-authors, Champy and Stanton,
form the basis of this thesis' review of the reengineering concept. A related concept
46
Hammer, Michael and Champy James Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business
Revolution (HarperBusiness: New York, 1993) 1 st ed., 24.
47
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27
which is the precursor to reengineering, "total quality management" (TQM), is also
reviewed so as to contrast the new thinking in the quest for efficiency in both private and
public sector organizations.
A. DEFINITION
Hammer and Stanton define, reengineering as "the fundamental rethinking and
radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in
performance". 30 Further elaboration on this definition will help to put the concept into
proper perspective.
Reengineering involves the most basic yet far reaching aspects of business
processes. Quite often people tend to concentrate on the complicated aspects at the
expense of the fundamental issues that give rise to those complicated issues. Hammer
and Champy give examples of some basic questions consistent with fundamental
rethinking; Why do we do what we do? Why do we do it the way we do? The
reengineering approach avoids taking things for granted, and thus avoids overlooking
non-value-adding processes.
Another characteristic of reengineering is that it entails radical redesign of
processes. As the authors note, "radical redesign means disregarding all existing
structures and procedures and inventing completely new ways of accomplishing work". 51
It is a fundamental departure from the traditional approach of incremental changes and,
for this reason, entails substantial risk taking.
The risk premium is the dramatic improvement that is expected to result from the
reengineering exercise. Whereas incremental changes normally result in marginal
improvements, reengineering, if done correctly, is supposed to result in "quantum leaps in
performance". Hammer and Champy suggest that if only marginal improvement is
desired, then there is no need for reengineering.
Finally, reengineering involves the redesign ofprocesses. A process is defined as
a series of tasks that together create value for the customer. It is considered to be the
49
Michael Hammer, Reengineering Management (New York: HarperBusiness, 1995)
50 Hammer and Stanton, p 3.
51 Hammer and Champy, p 33
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"heart" of every enterprise yet most organizations continue to lay emphasis on functional
rather than process management.
B. REENGINEERING PRINCIPLES
Michael Hammer's 1990 paper proposed seven principles of reengineering as
follows:
Organize around outcomes, not tasks.
Have those that use the output perform the process.
Subsume information processing work into the real work that produces the
information.
Treat geographically dispersed resources as though they were centralized.
Link parallel activities instead of integrating their results.
Put the decision point where the work is performed.
Capture information at its source.
In line with the above principles, Hammer and Champy observed certain
characteristics that typify reengineered processes and they are discussed below.
Severaljobs combine into one. This involves the integration and compression of
tasks so that the individual employee has more responsibility for a process. Individuals
with responsibility for the end to end process are referred to as 'case workers' and, where
they work in teams, as 'case teams'. Hammer and Champy argue that the pay-offs of this
approach include; the elimination of errors, delay, and rework; empowered employees
who are innovative, creative, and require less supervision. Employees, it is argued, take
responsibility for making sure that the customers' requirements are met on time and with
no defects.
Workers make decisions. The vertical compression of tasks reduces the
hierarchical decision-making layers to the extent that employees have more decision-
making opportunities. As Hammer and Champy put it, "instead of separating decision-
making from real work, decision-making becomes par/ of the work". They argue that the
benefits that accrue from this characteristic include fewer delays, lower overhead costs,
better customer response, and greater empowerment for workers.
52 Hammer and Champy, 50-64
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The steps in the process are performed in natural order. Reengineering results in
processes that follow natural order instead of the sequential "straight jacket" approach
where for example the work of one (step 2) cannot start before that of the other (step 1)
ends. While some processes may dictate that this be the case, in most circumstances
there is scope for concurrent or parallel processing of work. Step 2 for example could
commence as soon as there is enough information from Step 1 to get it going. This
simultaneous processing results in increased speed in completing jobs, and avoids the
inconveniences of rework that would otherwise result from intervening changes between
the start of first job and the next.
Processes have multiple versions. This characteristic entails a shift from
standardization to a situation where multiple versions of the same process are the norm.
This is necessary to meet the challenges of the changing environment. The main benefit
is the ability to tailor the process to meet individual customer requirements.
Work is performed where it makes the most sense. The focus on organizational
structure rather than processes results in work being performed sub-optimally. Placing
too much emphasis on specialization (as in traditional organizations) without due regard
to specific circumstances can end up being a costly exercise. Purchasing systems are
replete with examples where the cost of acquiring goods and services do not warrant
over-emphasis in specialization.
Controls are reduced. Reengineering seeks to eliminate non-value-adding
activities. Reengineered processes should result in controls being used only to the extent
that they make economic sense. Rather than focussing on the need for more controls, the
process itself should have in-built incentives against the anticipated problems.
Reconciliation is minimized. Reconciliation is another non-value-adding activity
which reengineering seeks to minimize. By reducing the number of contact points that the
process has, chances of inconsistent data are reduced and hence the need for
reconciliation.
A case manager provides a single point of contact. Where processes are
unavoidably complex, a case manager provides the link between customers and such
processes. This is also consistent with the need to reduce the number of contact points
referred to above. The case manager will shield the customers from the complexity of
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processes while providing information that could have been provided by the individuals
actually running the process. An integrated information system is critical to success in
this role.
Hybrid centralized/decentralized operations are prevalent. Information
technology is instrumental to realizing the benefits of both centralization and
decentralization. For example, a centralized database could benefit autonomous
departments/divisions whether they are centrally located or geographically dispersed.
Hammer and Champy provide the above characteristics as "examples" of
characteristics exhibited by most of the organizations (success stories) they studied. The
innovative nature of the reengineering process may well lead to different approaches and
even better designed processes. The changes that occur when an organization
reengineers are important to note: 53
Work units change from functional departments to process teams.
Jobs change from simple tasks to multi-dimensional work.
People's roles change from controlled to empowered.
Job preparation changes from training to education.
Focus of performance measures and compensation shifts from activity to
results.
Advancement criteria change from performance to ability.
Values change from protective to productive.
Managers change from supervisors to coaches.
Organizational structures change from hierarchical to flat.
Executives change from scorekeepers to leaders.
C. REENGINEERING PROCESS
Success in implementing the reengineering process requires committed leadership
good organization, and an analytical, creative approach. Hammer and Champy discuss
these issues at length and this section summarizes the key points. The section is arranged
into five parts dealing with:
Organization and leadership.
53 Hammer and Champy, 65-82.
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Identifying and selecting processes to be reengineered.
Understanding the processes and process redesign.
Strategies for implementation.
Reasons for failure.
1. Organization and Leadership
Five roles that have been instrumental in achieving reengineering success are the
leader, process owner, reengineering team, steering committee, and reengineering 'czar'.
Leader. The leader is normally "a senior executive who authorizes and motivates
the overall reengineering effort". The leader inspires employees through a well-
articulated vision of what the organization will look like after the reengineering process
and, through shared values and beliefs, motivates them towards an unequivocal mission.
Beyond communicating a common sense of purpose, the leader should create an
environment where barriers to reengineering, personnel or otherwise, can be dealt with
swiftly. The leader will present the first barrier if he does not understand the full purport
of reengineering, or if he exhibits wavering commitment to the process. Where the
organization intends to reengineer only a part of it (e.g. department), the designated
leader might be someone lower than the chief executive, but high enough to be in
effective control of resources used in that department's process.
Process owner. This is "a manager with responsibility for a specific process and
the reengineering effort focussed on it". In function oriented organizations, there are
often no managers who are responsible for a whole process. Processes normally cut
across functional boundaries and so it will be necessary to appoint process managers or
designate process owners for each process. In the reengineering process, the identified
process owner assembles the reengineering team and provides the team with leadership in
order to realize its goal.
Reengineering team. Reengineering teams perform the core of the reengineering
process. The teams are essentially self-directed and they produce the ideas and are often
required to see to the implementation of the reengineering process itself. Team members
consist of insiders and outsiders. The insiders are people currently working in the
process and bring with them valuable experience about the current flaws in the
organization. Their main shortcoming however is the possibility that their familiarity
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with the system might hamper creative thinking. Outsiders, on the other hand, are those
from outside the current process and they bring objectivity to the team.
Steering committee. Appointment of a steering committee is optional. This could
be made up of senior managers (not necessarily process owners) who are responsible for
the overall strategy of the reengineering program within the organization. The committee
deals with such issues as prioritization of reengineering projects and resolving problems
on allocation of resources and conflict that is necessarily a part of the process.
Reengineering 'czar'. The reengineering 'czar' provides strong support to the
leader who is often not able to devote a lot of time to the day-to-day management of the
reengineering effort. His two main functions are enabling and supporting each process
owner and reengineering team, and coordinating all ongoing reengineering activities.
The reengineering 'czar' should preferably have experience in previous reengineering
projects, but care should be taken to ensure that he does not take-over the role of the
leader and process owner who are in charge. Hammer and Champy emphasize that "the
work of reengineering has to be the line manager's job".
2. Identifying and Selecting Processes to be Reengineered
Most traditional organizations are organized according to functions and not
processes. People are therefore more familiar with the former. Since reengineering is
concerned with redesigning processes and not functions, the identification of processes
becomes paramount. Hammer and Champy suggest a technique that makes use of a
"process map".
The process map is more like the organizational chart except that it charts the
processes not the functions. A good starting point might be to describe the processes by
their start and end points. For example, procurement might be identified as "need
specification to delivery". Sub-processes would then be identified from this such that
instead of having only the high-level process maps, you also have lower-level process
maps. Simplicity is a key requirement for such maps, despite the challenges that arise
from cutting across functional boundaries.
Once the process maps are designed, the next stage is to choose the processes to
reengineer. Hammer and Champy suggest three criteria and these are broken processes,
important processes and feasible processes.
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Broken processes. Some processes are conspicuously dysfunctional to the extent
that it this "common knowledge" among an organization's executives and even the lower-
level employees. Often the symptoms are very clear and it is the diseases that need to be
diagnosed. One of the examples given illustrate this point is as follows:
Symptom: Extensive information exchange, data redundancy, and re-keying.
Disease: Arbitrary fragmentation of a natural process.
Important processes. The important processes are determined by their impact to
customers, both internal and external. Since each organization's mission invariably has to
meet the needs of its customers, customers themselves provide invaluable input for
determining the processes that fail to "deliver the goods".
Feasible processes. The likelihood of success of the reengineering effort must be
taken into account when deciding whether to reengineer or not. Suggested factors to be
considered include the scope, cost, and leadership commitment. Scope requires striking
the right balance between the expected pay-off and the likelihood of success. The wider
the scope of activities the greater the pay-off, but the lower the likelihood of success.
The costs are also critical because reengineering may entail investment in, for example,
high technology. In the final analysis however, reengineering cannot be feasible if
leadership is not committed to the reengineering cause.
3. Understanding the Process and Process Redesign
Before the reengineering team can proceed to redesign the process, the members
need to understand the process first. Detailed analysis of the current system is not critical
since reengineering seeks to "start on a clean slate". It might be necessary however, to go
into some detail to justify the need for change. Understanding the process entails
knowing process customer requirements and what the process currently provides.
The redesign stage demands creative thinking by team members. There is no set
formula or steps to be followed in determining how best the processes should be
configured. The principles already discussed and common sense should guide the teams
to come up with effective processes.
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4. Strategies for Implementation
The problems of managing change have received extensive attention and the
lessons learnt from such studies equally apply to the major changes that are necessarily a
part of reengineering. Hammer and Champy emphasize two messages that were
developed by companies that have had the most success in selling change to their
employees. The first message is about "where we are as a company and why we can't
stay here" and the second, "what we as a company need to become".
Employees need to be convinced of the urgency of the current situation and why it
is not conducive to survival. A "case for action" must be unequivocally made, and the
argument for change must be compelling for the employees to embrace reengineering as
the only salvation. In developing this argument, management also takes a critical look at
the organization and this may also result in other issues normally taken for granted being
addressed.
The second message entails articulating the organization's "vision" of where the
organization needs to be. It provides a rallying point for all employees and a challenging
yet feasible goal to attain.
The above issues point to the need for a comprehensive implementation strategy.
Failure to "sell" the need for and benefits of reengineering will render any attempt to
reengineer futile.
5. Reasons for Failure
Hammer and Stanton review the most commonly made mistakes in reengineering
and they list the top ten as follows:54
Don't reengineer but say that you are.
Don't focus on process.
Spend a lot of time analyzing the current situation.
Proceed without strong executive leadership.
Be timid in redesign.
Go directly from conceptual design to implementation.
Reengineer slowly.
Place some aspects of the business off limits.
54 Hammer and Stanton, 33.
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Adopt a conventional implementation style.
Ignore the concerns of your own people.
The underlying problem they note however is that "people engaged in the
reengineering effort don't know what they are doing". Another important facet of
reengineering is information technology.
D. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Technology plays a crucial role in reengineering organizations. It should be noted
however, that on its own, automation does not necessarily improve the way a process
works. It might improve the speed with which a process is completed without improving
the process itself. Hammer and Champy view information technology as an "essential
enabler" for reengineering and argue that "modem state of the art information technology
is part of any reengineering effort." The rate of technological change and the ever-
growing number of applications increase the scope for applying technology in the
reengineering process.
E. REENGINEERING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Public sector organizations are increasingly adopting practices common in the
private sector. The nature of competition and need for survival have forced the latter to
strive for innovative and efficient ways of providing for customers lest they lose them to
their competitors and go out of business. On the other hand, the public sector is
responding to the ever-diminishing resources by adopting those techniques that enable
them to achieve more with fewer resources, and thus ensure "survival".
Various techniques have been tried to improve productivity in the public sector.
For example, the evolution of budgeting techniques like MBO, ZBB, and PPBS sought to
build-in features that would enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the allocation and use
of resources. Despite these efforts, no dramatic improvements have been made in public
sector performance, and this explains why new initiatives in this respect are viewed with
skepticism. Of late, public institutions are increasingly turning to quality management as
55 Hammer and Champy, 83.
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a solution to public sector performance problems.
5
Process reengineering too, is
beginning to receive attention in the public sector's continuing search for excellence. The
ensuing discussion reviews some of the key aspects of the application quality
management and reengineering in the public sector.
The total quality management (TQM) concept emerged in the early 1980s. It is
regarded as both a philosophy and set of principles that guides organizational
transformation through continual improvement of the organization, improvement of
customer satisfaction, proper management of human resources, and use of quantitative
analysis to improve services. TQM is credited with the success of a large number of
Japanese and American corporations. Cases of failed attempts to use TQM as a vehicle
for improvement also abound, and the experience with both success and failure has
resulted in valuable lessons being learnt. Robert Cole proposed the following elements of
success in implementing TQM programs.
Sustained top management leadership for the quality initiative and active
application to their own daily management activities.
A relentless focus on the customer both in setting strategic objectives and in
building organizational routines that link as many units and levels in the firm
as possible to identifying and meeting customer needs.
Systematically improving the quality of all business processes from an
internal and external customer perspective.
A decentralization of decision-making responsibility to a well-trained labor
force.
A breaking down of organizational barriers, departments, and levels so that
cross-functional management becomes normal operating procedure.
A combined emphasis on both incremental continuous improvement and
break through strategies.
A realigning of reward and measurement systems, both formal and informal,
to support these new directions.
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Albert C. Hyde "Quality Reengineering and Performance: Managing Change in the Public Sector," The
Enduring Challenges in Public Management eds. Arie Halachmi and Geert Bouckaert (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995) 150-176
"Hyde, 179.
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TQM shares some common features with reengineering although the two are not
the same. The decision to embark on any or all of them is a major strategic decision and
calls for a deliberate strategic plan which includes such issues as articulating the
organization's vision and adoption of a common sense of purpose, stakeholder analysis,
analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis), selection
of a course of action among alternatives, and implementation strategies. Other significant
features common to both are, the crucial role of leadership, focus on process
improvement, customer focus, good human resource management, and decentralization
of decision-making and employee empowerment.
One major difference between TQM and reengineering is that unlike
reengineering, TQM seeks continual, long-term, incremental improvements. It focuses
on "doing things right" first time, and implementation is also usually organization wide.
Reengineering on the other hand is a short-term strategy for getting the organization on
the right path and it seeks dramatic improvements while focusing on "doing the right
things". Implementation may also occur across the whole organization or selected
processes may be reengineered at different times.
Hyde argues that quality management and reengineering can be "a viable
approach for improving productivity and performance in the public sector". 59 It is
apparent that the two concepts are not in conflict. If any thing more benefit may be
derived from implementing the two. A decision has to be made on whether to implement
either of the programs first, or to implement both simultaneously. Public sector
organizations that have made strides in implementing TQM are likely to be better
prepared to embrace reengineering since the two have a number of features in common.
On the other hand, the organizations that have yet to attempt to implement TQM might






IV. THE CURRENT BUDGETARY PROCESS
The major influences on the ZDF budgetary process are Zimbabwe's National
Defense Policy (NDP)6 and government's regulator framework through its budgetary
process. The extent to which NDP objectives are realized may be enhanced or
constrained by the Government budgetary process. It may also be the case that
formulation of NDP objectives is done oblivious of the constraining factors within the
Government budgetary process. This underscores the need to examine the two (NDP and
Government budgetary process) in order to identify constraints to the achievement of
defense modernization objectives.
This chapter will also examine the following: ZDF budgeting policy framework,
budget formulation, appropriation, negotiation, implementation, and review. The final
part of the chapter presents the results of a survey conducted to identify potential for
improvement in the budgetary process.
The discussion describes the ZDF budgetary process and through examples and
cases, illustrates some of its inherent weaknesses. This provides a basis for analyzing in
the next chapter, opportunities for improvement in general, and through process
reengineering in particular.
A. ZIMBABWE'S DEFENSE POLICY IMPLICATIONS ON THE BUDGET
In its broadest sense, Zimbabwe's NDP is based on a "defensive strategy". The
NDP document identifies the following as its "three key elements":
Defense of sovereignty and national interests.
Participation in the creation of a common regional security regime.
Contribution to international peace and stability.
The NDP provides an assessment of the "Strategic Security Environment" in the
global, regional and domestic context and makes "certain judgements that will naturally
affect our defense policy". The conclusions are as follows:
There is no immediate conventional strategic military threat of an armed
attack against Zimbabwe.
The latest "National Defense Policy" was published in 1997 replacing an earlier publication in 1989.
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There is no immediate threat to Zimbabwean interests at home and abroad that
will require the deployment of the Defense Forces.
There is a low risk of a military threat developing in the region that will
necessitate the deployment of the Defense Forces in the short and medium
term.
There is a likelihood of contributing troops, resources permitting, on
international peace keeping and humanitarian relief operations in the region
and on the continent.
The NDP notes Government's acknowledgement that "security environments are
by their nature unpredictable and subject to rapid change". There is need therefore, to
maintain an effective defense capability to respond any such eventuality. This has a
bearing on; how Zimbabwe's Defense Forces should be structured and equipped to
enhance capability, the economy and resource constraints, and the general structure of the
ZDF budget in relation to the economy.
1. Enhancing Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) Capability
The NDP emphasizes the need to enhance defense capability through "a well
motivated, well trained and well equipped Defense Force". 61 This is considered critical
to maintaining domestic and regional security, and maintaining a conducive environment
for promoting economic wellbeing and national development. When the size of the ZNA
was reduced from 5 1 000 to 40 000, it was a step towards achieving that end.
The restructuring is motivated by the need to adopt an appropriate strategy to
meet challenges posed by the current security and economic environment. The major
facets of the restructuring exercise include, reorganization of force structure,62 integrating
the civilian and military components of Ministry of Defense, and institution of a planning
and programming department. On the face of it, there are obvious benefits of such a
restructuring exercise. To what extent this is going to enable ZDF to achieve the goal of
enhanced capability will, it may be argued, depend its capacity to develop programs that
are both feasible and cost effective.
61 The President and ZDF commander-in-chief, Robert G Mugabe has often made remarks to this effect;
see for example his addresses to the Third and Fourth sessions of the Fourth Parliament on 1 July 1996 and
1 July 1997 respectively as reported by the official report, Hansard.
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2. The Economy and Resource Constraints
The NDP states that "due to current economic constraints, there is need to divert
financial resources (from defense to other sectors of the economy) in order to meet basic
socio-economic needs of the people". While Government acknowledges this need, it also
recognizes that "it will not be possible to cut the defence budget in the short-term".
There is no doubt that ZDF needs to modernize equipment so as to execute its
national and international roles more effectively. While ZDF views the prevailing peace
as an opportunity to improve defense capability that would otherwise be compromised by
cutting the defense budget, proponents of the "peace dividend" on the other hand, view it
as an opportunity to redirect resources from defense to other sectors. Given these
competing needs, measures to justify the efficacy of national investment in defense have
to be put in place.
The NDP identifies "three categories of defense spending" essential to enhancing
capability, namely: equipment procurement, operation and maintenance costs, and
personnel. Equipment procurement costs call for significant investment in new high-
technology equipment, and other equipment replacement and upgrading programs. In
order to maximize return from such investment, appropriate maintenance programs
would have to be implemented, while personnel should be suitably trained and motivated
to carry out their roles.
The NDP recognizes the contribution "efficient and effective resource
management" makes to attaining "a strong national defense capacity". It therefore
undertakes to continually review "organizational structures, systems and procedures", and
creation of the "Programming and Planning Department" is given as an example.
3. General Structure of the ZDF Budget
The structure of an organization's budget communicates its priorities, unless
appropriations are made arbitrarily. In Government, this applies at national, Ministry,
Department, and other lower levels with delegated responsibility for determining
resource requirements for government programs. This section provides some
observations about the structure of the ZDF budget, in particular its internal structure, and
62
Reorganization of force structure also includes reduction of the regular force and introduction of the
reserve force.
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its relation to selected social welfare programs (Education and Health) and the economy
in general.
a. Internal Structure ofZDF Budget Allocations
The bulk of the military component of the ZDF budget goes towards
salaries. In the 1997/98 fiscal year, ZNA's allocation for salaries was 82% compared
with 18% for other items (i.e. equipment, weaponry, vehicles, uniforms, rations, and all
other materiel and services required to sustain the ZDF). The AFZ budget, on the other
hand, was allocated 52% for salaries compared with 48% for other items. On average,
AFZ's allocations provide more for equipment than for salaries, and this is mainly due to
the cost of acquiring aircraft and maintaining them. The ZDF budget as a whole,
however, is still skewed in favor of salaries as Table 1 indicates. The average estimates
for the period July 1991 through December 2000 provided 76% for salaries and 24% for
the rest.
Projected estimates for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 indicate that the
proportion of salaries would be reduced to 73.3% and 72.5% respectively. This signals
the intention to provide more (at least in relative terms) funds to other programs, and
could be achieved either by increasing the level of funding for defense generally or by
further reduction in the size of the force, or both. While the budget is increasing in
nominal terms, there is a real decline in defense allocations. This decline, coupled with
the decline in the value of Zimbabwe's currency (dollar), will make it increasingly
difficult to secure adequate funds for the modernization program. There is need to revise
the structure of ZDF's budget and this will entail, among other strategies, striking a
balance between the mission and force structure.
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According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Year-Book for 1997, Zimbabwe's
military expenditure in 1987 was US$ 381 million, compared with US$ 238 in 1995. The figures are based


















































Figure 1. Distribution of ZDF Budget Between Salaries and Other Expenditure Items.
b. ZDFAllocations in Relation to Other Government Allocations
When concern is expressed about high levels of defense expenditure, it is
often stated in relation to basic social welfare programs, in particular the education and
health. The relative budget allocations for education, health, and defense are shown at
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Figure 2. For the 1997/98 fiscal year, the level of allocations relative to the total for vote
appropriations were: education, 30%; health, 8%; and defense, 12%.
In Zimbabwe there has been a call to reduce the level of defense spending
below that of health spending. By allocating a higher proportion of the budget to
defense, it is perceived in some quarters that Government assigns a higher priority to
defense than health, regardless of the people's suffering due to inadequate health facilities
and medicines. Defense planners need to take such public policy issues into account
when crafting their budgetary process. For example, part of the defense budget includes
provision of health services to serving and retired members and their families, yet the
current budget structure only reflects medicines and medical equipment, and not doctors
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Figure 2. Comparison of Defense Budget With Education and Health Budgets.
Reducing the defense budget when the current level of expenditure is
unable to sustain the ZDF in barracks would make efforts to modernize the ZDF
impossible, at least at its current strength. Alternative sources of funding would need to
be found both from within and outside the MOD.
c. ZDFExpenditure in Relation to the Economy in General
Table 1 indicates that military expenditure as a percentage of GNP has
been steadily declining since 1986. It was 6.4% in 1986 compared to 4% in 1995. The
defense burden (annual military expenditure per capita) has also been declining; it was
US$34 in 1986 compared to US$21 in 1995.
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The above indicators do not reflect the negative picture that critics of
defense expenditure in Zimbabwe like to paint. However, the indicators are not sufficient
to arrive at a definitive conclusion about the impact of defense spending on the
Zimbabwean economy. Comprehensive econometric testing of several economic
variables would need to be conducted, and even then, different assumptions could lead to
different conclusions. The value of conducting such an exercise cannot be over
emphasized. It is however beyond the scope of this thesis, and suffices to observe that
whatever the conclusions on the impact of ZDF expenditures, modernization cannot be
achieved at a lower level of resource endowment.
Table 1 . Military Expenditure in Relation to GNP and Population.










1986 542 6.4 34
1987 520 7.5 39
1988 546 6.3 35
1989 563 6.1 35
1990 559 5.3 30
1991 556 5.6 31
1992 511 5.5 28
1993 526 4.3 23
1994 528 3.9 20
1995 516 4.0 21
Source: "World Militeiry Expenditure 1996", US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Report, July, 1997.
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B. GOVERNMENT BUDGETING AS A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
1. Major Responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance and the National
Economic Planning Commission
The major institutions responsible for managing the government budget are the
Ministry of Finance (Treasury) and the National Economic Planning Commission
(NEPC). The latter is a ministerial level department falling under the executive.
The Fiscal and Economics Department in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) sets off
the budgetary process by conducting a macro economic appraisal and preparing "internal"
guidelines (Budget Framework Paper) for formulation of the budget at MOF/NEPC
level. This provides a basis for determining the appropriate fiscal policy targets to be met,
and determination of the global estimate of government revenue and expenditure for the
period under review.
The Budget Framework Paper also provides the basis for deciding how funds will
be allocated between capital and recurrent expenditure. In formulating the budget,
estimates proposed by various ministries/departments are taken into account. After
setting aside funds for constitutional and statutory provisions (e.g. salaries and pensions),
Treasury drafts proposed allocations for recurrent expenditure, and NEPC drafts
proposed allocations for capital expenditure, otherwise known as the Public Sector
Investment Program (PSIP). 64 The two are then consolidated into a "white paper" that
forms the basis of the Minister of Finance's budget presentation to Parliament.
2. Constitutional and Statutory Obligations for Managing Public
Finances
The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe (referred to as "the constitution"
for the remainder of this thesis) makes specific provisions for the management of
government finances. (Sections 101 to 106) Section 101 of the Constitution requires all
government revenues from whatever source to be paid into the Consolidated Revenue
Fund (CRF), except where an Act of Parliament authorizes payment into some other fund
established for a specific purpose, or where such Act authorizes retention by the receiving
authority for the purpose of defraying its expenses. The constitution also vests in
64
PSIP involves expenditure on construction and other infrastructure, but does not include other items of a
capital nature from a "capital budgeting point of view", e.g. equipment.
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Parliament, the authority to appropriate such funds from the CRF, although certain
expenditure is expressly authorized by the constitution. The primary input that prompts
Parliament to exercise its constitutional authority determine revenues and expenditures
for the year originates from the Minister of Finance.
Section 103 (1) imposes a responsibility on the Minister of Finance to lay before
Parliament, the estimates of revenue and expenditure of Zimbabwe for each year.
Parliament then sits to deliberate on the Minister's budget proposals. Two separate bills,
the Finance and Appropriation Bills, are introduced to deal with revenue and expenditure
estimates respectively. When passed by Parliament and signed by the president, they
become the Finance Act and Appropriation Act. There is also provision for a
Supplementary Appropriation Act to cater for cases where the amount appropriated by
the Appropriation Act is found to be insufficient, or where new urgent requirements
would have arisen. This of course depends on government's capacity to fund the
additional expenditure.
The Finance Act authorizes government departments to collect revenues through
specified levies such as income and excise taxes, custom duties, licenses etc. The
Minister of Finance is responsible for justifying to Parliament, proposals for sources of
revenue and levels of levies to be imposed.
The Appropriation Act on the other hand authorizes government departments to
incur expenditures and up to specified amounts for the programs that they would have
bidded. Each Minister is responsible for defending estimates for his/her Ministry in
Parliament. A major criticism of Zimbabwe's budgetary process up to this stage is that
Parliament does not really decide on national priorities as this is left to the bureaucracy.
This is evidenced by the fact that the MOF proposals rarely change when presented for
debate by Parliament.
Parliament's role goes beyond enactment of the Finance and Appropriation Acts.
It is also responsible for ensuring that public finances are managed efficiently. In order
to achieve this, the constitution makes provision for the appointment and functions of a
Comptroller and Auditor General. (Sections 105 and 106) The Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) is Parliament's "watch-dog" on how government ministries/departments
manage public funds. In addition, specific legislation in the form of the Audit and
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Exchequer Act provides for, among other things, the appointment, powers and duties of
the CAG and of his staff, and the examination and audit of all public accounts. In
addition to carrying out annual examination and audit of public accounts, Section 7 (b)
provides that the CAG "may carry out examinations into the economy, efficiency and
effectiveness with which any Ministry, statutory body, statutory fund or other body
whose accounts he is required to audit has used its resources in discharging its functions".
This expresses government's desire to realize value for money in its operations, hence the
mandate for value for money (VFM) audits.
The Audit and Exchequer Act (Section 19) also provides for the appointment of
internal auditors to assist Treasury in the management and control of public monies and
property. In contrast with the CAG, internal auditors are internal management tools
within each Ministry or department as the case may be, and has dual responsibility to the
accounting officer of the Ministry concerned, and to Treasury. 65 Unlike CAG, internal
auditors have no specific mandate to conduct VFM audits, although this may be included
under "any other function that may be assigned to (them) by the Accounting Officer of
the Ministry or Department concerned".
3. Government Budgetary Reforms
This thesis has already alluded to the economic pressures that Zimbabwe is
facing, and how this has brought pressure to bear on the government to improve its
management of public resources. Agencies such as the CAG have continually
highlighted those areas where government needs to improve. Although government
response has been slow, some significant reforms have recently been instituted. Of
particular relevance to this thesis is the introduction of the three-year rolling budget
system and expenditure management reforms.
Introduction of the three- year rolling budget system was expected to achieve the
following:
66
To enable ministries to identify their priorities which can be carried out within
the constraints of available resources.
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Accounting officers are normally the "permanent secretaries" of respective ministries or heads of some
quasi-autonomous departments.
66 Budget Statement presented to Parliament by the Minister of Finance on July 25, 1996.
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To make it easier for ministries to focus on medium term goals and outputs of
particular programs in relation to resources that they use.
To enable accounting officers to ensure that important programs are funded
adequately.
To encourage innovative thinking in the management of public funds.
It sought to give more responsibility and flexibility to accounting officers and thus
give them an opportunity to manage and control resources in their charge more efficiently
and effectively.
The major features of government's recent expenditure management reforms are
introduction of expenditure targets and the "stop-payment" system. Their introduction
was motivated by the need to improve cash management and to stop some government
ministries/departments from continuing to incur over-expenditure.
Expenditure targets involve prorating expenditure on a monthly basis. This would
result in more stable cash-flow projections to help treasury manage cash resources better.
It would also enforce "spending discipline" within ministries/departments for the benefit
of their own programs.
The stop payment system would ensure that checks were paid to creditors only to
the extent that funds for the relevant line items were available, and within the set monthly
targets. The system would therefore put a stop to over-expenditure. As this system was
applied, it became apparent that some ministries /departments continued to commit
government funds by placing orders and delaying the processing of documents for
payment until funds were "available"; needless to say that this inconvenienced suppliers
and introduced a new dimension of inefficiencies.
Government has progressively implemented other reforms such as, performance
management and computerization of systems, and it is now looking at implementing
performance budgeting. For the ZDF, these positive reforms should impact positively on
its ability to better manage scarce resources. There are however some constraining
factors of the government budgetary process. These include centralization and
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For the purpose of government accounting, over-expenditure (or spending in excess of the amount
appropriated by Parliament for a particular item) is considered as "unauthorized expenditure". This thesis
uses the expression "over-expenditure" to distinguish it from the case where government finances have
been applied to programs other than government programs.
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inflexibility of the system in such areas as financial management and procurement. The
impact of these and other constraining factors will become apparent when the ZDF
budgetary process is specifically addressed in the next two chapters. For the moment it
suffices to observe that such constraints stifle initiative to the extent that instead of
government departments proposing better ways of managing finances, they simply look
to MOF to provide "solutions".
The ZDF budgetary system operates within this general framework of government
budgeting. Its budgetary policy framework therefore mirrors the government framework
in many respects.
C. ZDF BUDGETING POLICY FRAMEWORK
1. Policy Analysis and Evaluation
ZDF operates in a socio-economic environment that imposes a lot of constraints
on decision making. Important decisions have to be made on such issues as force
structure, procurement programs, maintenance and other logistic programs, training and
development, and human resource management, and it is increasingly getting difficult to
justify policy choices based on an "intuitive" decision making process.
ZDF does not use policy analysis tools such as operations research, cost-benefit
analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis etc. as decision-making tools to select optimal
strategies for meeting its objectives. The absence of such rational analysis entails
reliance on intuitive decisions whether taken individually or on the basis of collective
effort through boards of inquiry, committees, meetings or other groups created for such
purposes. ZDF' current decision-making model manifests itself in its inability to sustain
selected projects, ineffectiveness in justifying defense projects to stakeholders, and more
generally, confusion at all staff levels on which direction the organization is going.
Assuming that ZDF was committed to implementing the rational policy analyses
model immediately, questions that quickly come to mind in terms of capacity to
implement it effectively are: Does ZDF have the human resource base capable of
conducting such analyses? Is data suitably organized for that purpose readily available?
Does ZDF have appropriate information technology resources to support such an
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undertaking? Does leadership commitment go beyond rhetoric endorsement to
"championing" the model?
This thesis would argue that answers to these questions tend toward the negative,
as further discussion on the current budgetary process would testify. Such a model would
operate best in an environment where clear objectives guide staff action. Some
perspectives on objective setting in ZDF are discussed below.
2. Setting of Objectives
The NDP provides a framework for setting objectives in the ZDF. NDP
objectives are generally too broad to base specific projects on. For ZDF to succeed in
fulfilling its mandate under the constitution, it is necessary therefore, ZDF leadership to
communicate unequivocal objectives supported by resources to make them achievable.
Likewise subordinate commanders at all levels should communicate clear performance
related objectives capable of objective evaluation.
Commander Zimbabwe Defense Forces (CDF) therefore sets objectives to be
achieved by the ZDF each year. The objectives normally cover a period of one year, and
are directed to the individual service commanders and chiefs-of-staff in ZDF HQ. The
service commanders in turn set their objectives in like manner and disseminate them to
subordinate commanders. Major flaws in the current objective setting process are as
follows:
Objectives are not linked to the budgetary process and hence the resources to
accomplish them. The tendency for objectives that are not matched with
resources is to set them too high to the extent that they become "wish lists". It
is difficult if not impossible to evaluate whether the organization is in fact
making progress or not. If anything negative signals are likely to be sent
leading to frustration and at worst a degenerating work ethic.
There are no program objectives linked to specific budgets. For example, a
"company commanders training program" could have among its objectives,
training a certain number of officers in a given period and achieving specified
and measurable performance standards, and the program would have a
specific budget (i.e. resources sufficient to achieve the objectives). ZDF has
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not yet introduced program based budgeting, and it may be argued that this is
a serious impediment to efficient resource management.
Objectives are derived from a top-down approach with very little input from
below. The problem with this approach is that it ignores real and fundamental
concerns that impede progress, and it has the effect of wishing away problems
inherent in the system. Lack of ownership of problems by lower levels of
command is a consequence of this approach, and it leads to an attitude that
looks up to "the commanders" for solutions at the expense of innovative
thinking. Effective planning that leads to results cannot therefore be achieved.
In addition to the annual statements of objectives discussed above, service
commanders issue other directives either on a regular or ad hoc basis, specifying what
units need to do to achieve certain ends. This also communicates new or modified
objectives on a continual basis.
Feedback on achievement or otherwise of these objectives is normally in the form
of annual reports, although interim reports may be made in some cases. Commanders at
various levels are also required to conduct inspections to assess progress in meeting
objectives.
Objectives are critical to any budgetary process or system. The evolution of
budgeting systems introduced focus on, among other things, objectives, performance, and
program analysis and evaluation, multi-year planning. Effective contemporary budgeting
systems have such features.
3. The ZDF "Budgeting System"
Budgeting systems have, over the years, lost specific identity as organizations
crafted budgetary processes from all available concepts to suit their specific
requirements. The ZDF system also, cannot be specifically identified as incremental
budgeting, ZBB or any other. Characteristics of incremental budgeting and ZBB,
particularly the former, tend to be predominant in the ZDF budgetary process. The
following observations may account for this tendency:
Incremental budgeting is simple to operate. It demands far less resources than
other systems in terms of skilled human resources (e.g. policy analysts),
information technology, data etc..
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The absence of establishment tables make the exercise of determining "short
falls" more an exercise of making best guesses, and the gap between effective
requirements and what the budget can afford is too wide to render any
elaborate exercise to determine "zero base requirements" not worth its while.
The government system which ZDF is "required" to follow stifles innovation
and provides an "easy way out"
It would be in ZDF's interest to cease the challenge for "innovative thinking in the
management of public funds" referred to in the Minister of Finance's budget statement to
Parliament on July 25,1996.
4. Multi-Year Planning and Programming and the Three-Year Rolling
Budget System
ZDF adopted the three-year rolling budget system in 1997 by virtue of it
operating within the general government-wide budgetary framework. Prior to this
development, multi-year financial planning had often been muted without firm
commitment to its implementation. Under this system, Government provides indicative
figures for financial resources likely to be made available in the future, and this provides
an opportunity for the ZDF to develop its program alternatives from which policy
analysis tools can be used to determine optimal choices. Until ZDF embraces program
budgeting and rational analysis based on quantitative techniques, this would continue to
represent lost opportunity.
When this system was introduced, ZDF was ill-prepared to take advantage of it.
Firstly, the time between promulgation of the new system by MOF and the
implementation date was too short. Time to develop optimal programs was therefore not
available. While it is tempting to conclude that this problem was supposed to affect the
initial year, it should be noted that commitment to some ill-conceived programs in the
first year spanned across the planning/budget period. For the same reason, it would be
prudent therefore to review subsequent years' estimates to make appropriate adjustments
that will result in optimal benefit to the organization.
Secondly, the planning system to determine how much was to be spent and on
what program for each of the three years was fragmented and not based on standard
policy guidelines. No guidelines, or objectives to be achieved in the next three years
53
preceded introduction of the system. This resulted in fragmented planning, and the time
factor discussed above made achievement of credible plans or programs impractical.
The above indicates that conception of positive reforms alone is unlikely to yield
desired outcomes. A strategy for managing the change would have led to a more
successful implementation phase.
5. Line-Item Basis for Managing the Budget
The ZDF budgetary process is currently based on line-item rather than program or
mission budgeting. The budget for vehicle spares in the ZDF, for example, is centralized
and all units draw their spares from a central ordnance depot. No track of the value of
Aft
spares issued to the various units, or for specific purposes is kept. Some of the problems
emanating from this approach have been alluded to above. It suffices here to emphasize
the difficulty in evaluating performance relative to resource inputs for specific programs.
Steps have been taken to introduce program budgeting. These include the
establishment of the Programs Department, the Programming and Planning Council
chaired by the Secretary for Defense, and the Programming and Planning Staff
Committee chaired by the Deputy Secretary for Finance and Administration. Despite
these institutional arrangements, program budgeting is not yet in force.
D. BUDGET FORMULATION
From a ZDF perspective, budget formulation involves is the process of compiling
and submitting estimates of revenue and expenditure. More emphasis though is placed
on expenditure than on revenue and unit level, revenue estimates are rarely required.
1. Initiating the Annual Budget Cycle
Treasury initiates the cycle by calling for all ministries/departments to prepare
and submit estimates of revenue and expenditure. MOD disseminates the same
information to ZNA and AFZ and this information filters down to unit level. Despite this
being an annual requirement due for submission on approximately the same date, most
units only start preparing their estimates when they receive the instruction calling for
estimates. Budgeting is viewed as a once off annual exercise and not as a continuous
68
In some exceptional circumstances, such as for UN missions, specific budgets are not made but track is
kept of spares (and other resources) used for the purpose of claiming reimbursement.
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process. The problems associated with this approach are: arbitrariness in determining the
estimates, inadequate time to consider the justification of the estimates, and delay in
finalizing the estimates.
Typically the instruction from Treasury includes such issues as deadlines for
submission and formats. When the instruction is disseminated down ZDF's chain of
command, very little additional information to guide relevant staff on budget priorities,
for example, is included. In the absence of prior guidelines as suggested above,
budgeting tends to be fragmented and lacking in complementarity.
Treasury also communicates the indicative global estimate for each Ministry and
specifies the tentative estimate for salaries, wages and allowances which cannot to be
changed without Treasury authority. MOD, then breaks this appropriate portion of the
global estimate down among MOD head office and the two services. The services in turn
determine the planning figures for directorates and in some cases, formations and units.
While treasury's global estimate might be different from the figure proposed in the
previous year's proposal under the three-year rolling budget system, it would not be so far
off as to render the latter an ineffective planning mechanism.
2. Preparation of Estimates
The actual preparation of estimates is a bottom-up process. It starts at unit level
where shortfalls and other requirements are determined and submitted to the formation
headquarters. In addition to preparing its own estimates, the formation headquarters uses
the information submitted by units to determine its overall estimates.69 Adjustments to
requirements presented by units are invariably adjusted otherwise costing them as
presented would result in a figure that makes a mockery of the constraint imposed by
Treasury.
The formation estimates are then submitted to the respective service headquarters
where they are similarly collated and adjusted before they are sent to ZDF HQ. ZDF HQ
staff and their civilian counterparts in MOD prepare and consolidate suitably adjusted
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Units and formations are responsible for providing only some of the estimates. For example, items like
weapons, vehicles, bulk purchase vehicle spares etc are provided for by respective directorates in Army
HQ. Units instead provide their requirements to appropriate Directorates in Army HQ through their
respective formation headquarters.
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estimates for the head office, ZNA and AFZ. The Secretary for Defense, in his capacity
as MOD's accounting officer, then makes the final submission to Treasury.
3. Revenue Estimates
Generally units/formations are not specifically required to present revenue
estimates. At formation level however, they are required to maintain rent registers.
Actual revenue estimates are prepared at service HQs. In all other cases such as fines and
recoveries from lost state property, there is no such requirement.
There is no motivation therefore, to manage the revenue side of public finances.
At the ZDF level, introduction of the Defense Procurement Fund into which revenues
from sale of redundant assets may be channeled for procurement of new equipment is a
positive exception. All other revenue is channeled to the CRF and whether more or less
revenue is collected has no apparent significance to ZDF's level of funding.
Preparation of estimates of expenditure involves negotiation in response to budget
constraints and competing requirements among various elements of the organization.
E. NEGOTIATION PROCESS
Unit level involvement in formulating estimates of expenditure is minimal. There
is therefore, no significant negotiation that takes place at that level. Even at formation
level, their major involvement is in computing shortfalls and assigning them costs rather
than budgeting for specific programs (the "line-item" versus "program" approach
argument). There is also no significant negotiation that formations can engage in.
Negotiation becomes more significant at Army HQ and MOD.
Major players in the budgeting formulation process at Army HQ are the
Commander and his chiefs-of-staff, Finance Branch, directorates, and their sponsor
branches. It is at this level that decisions on procurement of equipment and weapon
systems, and on consolidated requirements from formations are made. The process
typically involves the Commander identifying his priority areas and the relevant
directorates proposing funds required to meet those priorities. Trade-offs are then made
between competing requirements within and among the directorates in order to stay
within the indicative estimate received from MOD. Negotiations at this level provide the
basis for justifying ZNA estimates at MOD/ZDF HQ.
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Negotiations at this level seek to ensure that projects are appropriately justified
and that defense objectives can be met within the given constraints. Adjustments may be
made to ZNA and AFZ submissions as a result. Before the final estimates are submitted
to Treasury, there is extensive consultation between them and the Ministry.
The final stage of the negotiation process occurs when the Appropriation Bill is
tabled for discussion in Parliament. The Minister of Defense is involved in this process,
as he is required to provide justification for his Ministry's estimates. Any variation in




The Minister of Finance presents the budget proposals to Parliament in terms of
section 103 (1) of the constitution. He does this after consultation with his other cabinet
colleagues and the executive in general so as to reconcile the proposals with government
socio-economic and political goals.
Each functional cabinet minister is responsible for steering the estimates for
his/her Ministry through Parliament. This involves presenting the rationale for the
estimates and responding to any queries raised by legislators. Previous debates on the
defense budget indicate that legislators are more concerned with the level of spending
rather than the programs that MOD intends to fund, and about issues of accountability in
the management resources allocated to defense.
The constitution also provides for supplementary appropriations (Section 103 (3))
and condonation of unauthorized expenditure (Section 103 (5)). Like the regular
appropriations, the minister of defense has to justify them in Parliament. Due to scarcity
of funds, government is often unable to fund all "urgent" missions (e.g. peace keeping
missions) that MOD is obligated to undertake. Under such circumstances, Treasury
insists on MOD sacrificing other programs to fund such missions.
A major concern frequently raised by ZDF is the under-funding that characterizes
defense appropriations. Under-funding is blamed for ZDF's failure to: conduct
meaningful re-equipment programs, maintain the resultant over-burdened equipment, and
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provide some basic services among a host of other problems. Inefficient resource
management exacerbates this problem, and improvement in this respect can alleviate the
impact of the under-funding. In the absence of evidence that the under-funding problem
will be resolved in the near future, it is logical to argue for more and immediate focus on
resolving ZDF's resource management problems, while working on a program to solicit
funding for defense programs.
The appropriated finances are managed through a fairly standard administrative
framework that applies government-wide. The framework is discussed below.
2. Administrative Framework for Managing the Appropriations
For management purposes, the budget is broken down into several categories.
Budget in this case refers to the expenditure budget since Parliament does not approve a
particular revenue budget for each Ministry. The expenditure budget categories are
briefly explained below:
Votes. Each Ministry's budget is referred to as a vote and is designated by a
number. The MOD budget, for example, is designated "Vote 4".
Sub-votes. Budgets for major departments within the Ministry are referred to
as sub-votes. There are three sub-votes in the Ministry of defense, namely:
Head Office, Army and Air Force.
Sub-heads. Within each sub-vote, major expenditure areas are categorized as
sub-heads (e.g. Sub-head A is for "Salaries Wages and Allowances").
Items and Sub-Items. These are further categorizations where a number of
sub-items make up an item, and a number of items make up a sub-head.
The rationale for such categorization is that it enables each significant part of the
budget to be assigned a specific controller. It also facilitates proper accounting and
transfer of funds from one area to another, and the level of authority to effect such
transfers is based on these categories. The transfer of funds from one account to another
is referred to as the virement process. The MOD Accounting Officer, as with his
counterparts in other Ministries, can only approve virements between and within items
and sub-items under the same sub-head. Virements between sub-heads and sub-votes are
referred to Treasury for approval.
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G. IMPLEMENTATION
Broadly defined implementation involves the conversion of financial resources
into other resources and the management of and accounting for those resources. The
scope of implementation as defined here is rather too wide to facilitate discussion of
every aspect in this thesis. For this reason selected cases from which major opportunities
for improving the budgetary process can be identified are discussed. The cases discussed
are: pay and records administration, purchasing cycle, expenditure control, human
resource management, and materiel resource management.
1. Case 1: Pay and Records Administration
Salaries constitute the major part ( 76% on average) of the ZDF budget compared
to provision of other goods and services, yet management focuses more attention on
improving the institutions and processes for the latter than for the former. This section
considers some of the issues pertaining to the ZNA's pay and records system.
The Directorate of Army Pay and Records (DAPAR) is responsible for pay and
records administration for all ZNA members. As its main resource, DAPAR relies on
Army Data Processing Unit (ADPU) for processing of pay and records input. DAPAR
then makes the arrangements for physical payment ofmembers and for accounting for the
entire salaries budget. Personnel records administration falls under DAPAR's purview
since most changes in members' status (e.g. promotion) also affect their pay. Two major
issues are of interest for this thesis and these are DAPAR's organization and staffing, and
the role of information technology.
a. Organization and Staffing
Over the years, the organization and staffing of DAPAR has been very
dynamic. Major changes were motivated mostly by perceptions that reduction in staff
was a natural consequence of computerizing the pay system. It is, however a grave
misconception to assume that computerization can be a panacea to administrative or
indeed any other problems, and any decisions guided by this belief rather than by careful
study of potential benefits and pitfalls of technology often lead to dysfunctional
outcomes.
For DAPAR, the issues summed up below were a manifestation of lack of
a discernible strategy to benefit from information technology. The personnel
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establishment was reduced to the extent that the unit could not function effectively.
Typically, DAPAR was given a figure beyond which their staff was not to exceed and it
was DAPAR's responsibility to develop an organizational structure to fit around that
figure. On adopting the reduced organizational structure, trained staff were relegated to
the "surplus list" and so they opted for transfer to other units. A serious constraint was
also placed on DAPAR's capacity to deliver quality service that was expected of them.
Following representations on the extent of the problem, Army HQ authorized attachment
of staff from other units. The attached staff lacked training and experience and tended to
slow-down the execution of duties by the regular component.
The pressure to reduce staff emanated from the desire to use posts that
could be saved from non-operational units in operational units, and DAPAR was a target
due to the "staff-saving" nature of technology in its employ. ZNA could have looked at
other options to save such posts such as using a civilian-run computer bureau, or
"civilianizing" a majority ofDAPAR posts. There obviously are pros and cons for each
of these options, and a rational analysis to assess cost effectiveness of alternative options
could have been used to aid the decision-making process.
b. Role ofInformation Technology
Processing pay and records is but one of ADPU's several tasks. Other
tasks include management information systems for vehicles, fuels, drugs, medical
equipment etc.. All these systems are processed centrally on ADPU's mainframe
computer system. Where terminals have been installed at remote sites, they are mostly
used for data input and word-processing. The record for the ZNA's ability to exploit
information technology is not impressive. ADPU's mainframe based system has never
been used to full capacity since its introduction into the organization in the mid-1980s,
yet the system is already being considered as obsolete. Its usage has also been fraught
with inefficiencies. For the pay and records administration in particular, the discussion
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AFZ, for example, uses a Government bureau (Salary Services Bureau) to process its members' salaries.
A major criticism of this bureau is its inflexibility to deal with urgent issues, and a long processing cycle.
On average, it takes about three months between publication of an occurrence that affects a member's pay
and payment to the member. AFZ does not also have control over the organization as there is no
contractual arrangement between them. This arrangement could have been different if a civilian firm had
been engaged to provide such services.
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below provides an instructive example of failure to optimize exploitation of information
technology resources.
To execute its responsibilities, DAPAR obtains input from all units
scattered around the country and codes that data onto input forms. The input forms are
then submitted to ADPU for input and processing. DAPAR, however, has limited
capacity for punching input without going through ADPU.
Using a member's change of status from "general duties" to "specialist" an
example, such change entitles the member to a higher salary based on professional
qualifications and nature of employment. Army HQ authorizes such change and notifies
both DAPAR and the unit concerned through "signal". On receipt of the signal, the unit
publishes this authority through "Part 2 Orders" which it then sends to DAPAR for
adjustment to be made on the member's, pay and records file. DAPAR then transcribes
(in coded form) the data from Part 2 Orders onto computer input forms to facilitate
punching of details into the computer. Below are examples of some efficiency problems
associated with centralized processing and the structure of the system itself that could
benefit from "innovative" application of information technology.
Quality ofService. The first problem is associated with transmission of
documents to DAPAR. Mailing through postal services sometimes results in
documents being lost or delayed in transit. This negates the quality of service
given to ZNA members due to delays in making necessary adjustments to
their pay.
Non-Value Adding Activities. Data is not captured source but instead it goes
through some non-value adding processes (e.g. Unit publication of Part 2
Orders and APAR's compilation of input forms) before it is captured.
Redundancyfrom Lack ofProper Integration ofPay and Personnel Records
Systems. DAPAR's responsibility for records entails updating personnel
records and providing Careers Department staff with accurate information for
use in their personnel function. Data capture is centralized, and input
punched-in for pay purposes does not automatically update the personnel
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"Part 2 Orders" is the medium used to promulgate specified personal occurrences that affect a member's
pay and personnel record files.
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record files. In the example given above, if Careers were to call for the master
record file of the individual concerned, it would still indicate him/her as a
"general duties" member. Two sets of input forms therefore are completed,
one for updating pay and the other for updating the personnel record. Lack of
integration of the two systems results in costly duplication of effort,
inaccuracy and inconsistency of information, and distorted manpower
statistics.
c. Comment on Case
The above case indicates flaws within the decision making process. Focus
on operations tended to cloud judgement in deciding the value of supporting services and
consequently the latter became a target for "arbitrary" manpower reductions. It can be
argued that this is among the major contributors to the resource management crisis that
the ZNA has to contend with to this date. Opportunities for "saving" operational posts
such as "civilianizing" some posts and outsourcing may need to be explored, and this
might need a reassessment of the organization's "over-sensitivity" about security.
While it is generally true that employment of information technology leads
to savings in manpower, particularly where routine repetitive tasks are involved, its
introduction needs to be based on careful study and a deliberate implementation strategy,
other wise the perceived benefits will not be realized. The rapid changes in information
technology provide opportunities that ZNA has to cease if it needs to mitigate some of
the resource constraints that have become the order of the day. Networks can facilitate
capturing input at source, obviate a lot of non-value adding activities, reduce paper-work,
and facilitate better communication through such services as electronic mail.
2. Case 2: Purchasing Cycle
Most critics of ZDF management systems view purchasing as the weakest area in
the management of resources. This case reviews the major aspects of the purchasing
system in particular the following: tender procedures, and requisitioning and payment for
goods and services.
a. Tender Procedures
Appendix 2 to Treasury Instructions provides the "Rules for the
Procurement of Supplies and Services" (referred to as "the Rules" in the rest of the thesis)
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for all government departments. The main feature of the government purchasing
system, which seeks "to purchase is stores and to obtain services required with a
maximum of economy and efficiency", is its tender system. When designing its internal
rules on purchasing, MOD is obliged to ensure that they are consistent with the
government tender system. The system requires all goods and services to be procured
after inviting competitive bids from potential suppliers. An exception to this rule is
where there is only one known supplier, in which case "special purchase" can be made.
In all cases, appropriate tender approval is to be sought.
The Government Tender Board (GTB) is responsible for defining the
general policy concerning the invitation, evaluation and award of tenders. Not only is
GTB a policy setting body, it implements such policy by exercising the same functions.
It advertises, evaluates and awards tenders for all ministries and some government
enterprises. MOD is exempted from this procedure only in the case of purchase of
classified security items such as weapon systems and communications equipment.
Centralization of decisions on government contracts seeks to achieve "economy and
efficiency" by exploiting economies of scale, ensuring standardization, and providing
safeguards for due delivery and dealing with any breaches.
The Rules stipulate different tender authorization levels based on value of
goods/services to be purchased. In addition, ministries may set their own limits and
operating procedures, provided of course they are consistent with the Rules. Limits may
be revised from time to time and the current ones (at exchange rate ZWS17.5 = US$1) are
as follows:
Government Tender Board (GTB) Approval (formal tenders only) - no limit,
but some projects require prior Cabinet authorization.
General Tenders Committee (GTC) Approval - no authorization powers, but
recommends award of tenders to the Accounting Officer, who in turn
recommends to GTB.
Informal Tenders Committee (Army HQ level) - US$8, 600.
Informal Tenders Committee (Formation HQ level) - US$1, 700.
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The rules are prescribed by the Zimbabwe Government Tender Board with the approval of the Minister
of Finance.
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Directorate of Purchasing (DP) - US$ 1 , 700.
The procedure for obtaining authority to purchase or obtain goods or
services can be conveniently summarized as a series of steps. The steps followed for
formal tenders are as follows:
Step 1: User department originates specification and submits it to DP.
Step 2: DP prepares recommendations for advertising the tender and submits
them to MOD for consideration by GTC.
Step 3: GTC deliberates on the recommendations and makes a decision on
whether to proceed as recommended (with or without amendments) or not.
GTC makes its recommendations to the accounting officer who in turn makes
his recommendation to GTB.
Step 4: GTB goes through the same review process and decides whether to
advertise the tender or not.
Step 5: If GTB approves, the tender is advertised for a period of 14 to 27
days. When tenders close, bidders submit their bids to GTB where they are
opened in public, stamped, and signed to authenticate the official submission.
The tender documents are then passed on to MOD, who in turn pass them to
DP for preliminary evaluation.
Step 6: DP evaluates the tender in conjunction with the user-department and
submits recommendations to MOD.
Step 7: At MOD, GTC secretariat evaluates the same tender and makes
recommendations to GTC. GTC deliberates on the evaluation and submits
recommendations to the accounting officer. If he approves, he makes
recommendations GTB, otherwise discrepancies have to be cleared with GTC
first.
Step 8: At GTB, the secretariat evaluates the tender and makes
recommendations for GTB consideration. GTB then makes the final
determination and awards the tender in full or in part to one or more bidders
depending on the nature of the goods or services to be procured.
Step 9: MOD is notified of GTB's decision and in turn advises the companies
concerned and DP.
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Step 10: Formal contracts are then drafted and signed, and the user department
may then place orders through DP as required.
There are problems associated with these procedures. Among the major
ones are: cost of delays inherent in the system and failure to obtain value for money due
to emphasis on "cheapest" priced bids.
Cost of Delays. The process to get tender approval is a lengthy one.
Centralization at GTB level necessitates a number of intermediate steps or stages.
Queries that might be raised on recommendations from the earlier stages result in issues
being referred back and forth. The committees involved in the decision making process
meet once per week, and any issues not conclusively dealt with at one meeting are
therefore deferred to subsequent meetings.
Delays are also occasioned by the laborious nature of the evaluation
process. In the first place there are at least three stages where a similar evaluation
process on the same tender is carried out (i.e. DP, GTC and GTB). Secondly, the staff
that evaluates the tenders rely on a manual system and given the number of items
involved in some tenders (e.g. motor vehicle spares), the process becomes unwieldy and
exposes government to risk of financial loss through mistakes or unscrupulous
manipulation for personal gain.
For running contracts that have to be renewed annually, delays result in
some periods where there is no competent authority to purchase goods and services. In
the case of fixed delivery contracts, delays of six or more months between the lodging of
bids by potential suppliers and the award of tenders by GTB are common. Such delays
may, due to intervening circumstances, force the winning potential suppliers to apply for
price variation before the contract is even implemented. In such cases original
competitors might be asked to confirm whether their tendered prices are still firm,
otherwise the tender process would have to be redone.
GTB centralization and duplication of functions lengthen the purchasing
cycle and this introduces avoidable costs. Such costs are manifested in a large
procurement staff and inefficiency in the management of resources.
Cheapest Price Orientation. In principle, government purchases seek to
obtain value for money. In practice, however, there is an apparent orientation towards
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awarding tenders on the basis of the lowest priced bid. It may be argued that budgetary
pressures and the difficulty of proving transparency when considering such factors as
quality contribute to this orientation. The outcome of this problem is that ZNA takes
delivery of goods and services of questionable quality at the expense of obtaining value
for money.
b. Requisitioningfor Goods and Services
Once the relevant tender authorities have been established and contracts
signed, user-departments may place orders as required, as long as funds for the purpose
are available. It sometimes occurs that the tender is awarded but for one reason or
another, funds are not available, and placing orders under such circumstances results in
the organization incurring "unauthorized expenditure".
The requisitioning process involves the user department making a formal
request for purchase to DP, who then raise the order (requisition) with the contracted
supplier. DP action includes checking that the requirement is consistent with the terms of
the contract, and checking through the commitment register that funds for the purpose are
available. The final stage of this process is delivery. The user department is responsible
for certifying that goods/services delivered meet the ZNA specifications.
Some problems are encountered during delivery. These include failure of
companies to meet delivery schedules and quality standards. The ZNA's share of these
problems emanate from reluctance to specify anticipated delivery schedules when
adverting the tender and the lack of capacity to specify and evaluate quality standards.
Reluctance to specify delivery schedules is a consequence of ZNA's financial
management system that cannot guarantee that commitments made in advance will be
funded.
c. Paymentfor Goods and Services
Most suppliers invoice their goods/services immediately after delivery.
The unit receiving the goods/services then checks and certifies that delivery is good in
terms of quantity, quality, price billed and any other terms stipulated in the relevant
contracts. The unit then processes payment documents (original requisition, supplier
invoices, delivery notes etc.) to DP for further checking and control purposes. After
checking by DP, the documents are sent to Finance Branch where largely the same
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procedures are followed. Finance Branch sends the documents to MOD Finance Section
again for checking and control purposes. Finally, documents are then sent to Central
Payments Office (CPO) for payment to be made to the supplier.
The payment system involves several intermediate stages. Also worthy of
note is the fact that payments for goods and services delivered to all ministries are made
through one centralized government agency, CPO. This process inevitably results in a
high incidence of late payments. On occasions, suppliers withhold further delivery of
supplies or services pending and payment much to the detriment of prospective users.
The process also leads to poor buyer/supplier relationships, and ZNA cannot obviously
benefit from such relationship. The volume of transactions coupled with multiple
handling also creates opportunity for fraud and corrupt practices.
3. Case 3: Expenditure Control
Government instituted expenditure control reforms in an effort to ensure that
ministries did not incur unauthorized expenditure. The major expenditure control tool
was the commitment register. Due to limited effectiveness in using commitment registers
as a control tool, government introduced a "stop-payment system" but this too, had its
problems. These two significant control measures are discussed below.
a. Commitment Registers
The purpose of the commitment register is to keep track of the balance on
specific budget items by recording the initial allocation and then adjusting for any
financial commitments made (i.e. orders placed with suppliers). In some cases the
balance is adjusted due to virements that may be authorized from time to time. No
commitment of funds may be made if the balance on the item is insufficient to meet new
requirements. It is more like maintaining a personal check account where one cannot
write checks if he/she does not have enough money in the account. The commitment
registers are maintained at the following levels: vote-controller, DP, Finance Branch and
MOD Accounts.
In effect, commitment is made at purchasing level, and other levels
(except vote-controllers) maintain committed registers. Vote-controllers 1 commitment
registers act as memorandum records of requests made to DP for orders to be placed, and
to duplicate the commitments made by DP. Finance Branch and MOD Accounts Office
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maintain committed registers that are based on values of goods or services already
supplied and invoiced.
Despite the existence of commitment registers, budget items are
sometimes over-spent. This may be due to supplier bills exceeding amounts committed
(e.g. where commitments are based on estimates as with vehicle repair), under-funding
resulting in "lack of options to deal with inescapable expenditure", or simply flagrant
violation. This situation led to government introducing further controls such as the stop
payment system.
b. "Stop-Payment" System
Government introduced the stop-payment system after it had become
apparent that despite impressing on the ministries and departments to use commitment
registers effectively, they continued to over-spend. The system also introduced monthly
expenditure targets, and payment vouchers in excess of the targets would not be paid.
When it was first introduced, the system was fraught with problems. For
example, one problem concerned non-payment of vouchers due to misallocation of
transactions. Where a wrong computer code was charged, the balance on that item would
in some cases be inadequate to cover genuine requirements and so depriving the suppliers
early settlement of their bills. In some cases orders would still be placed and
goods/services delivered regardless of the inadequate balance to meet the commitments.
The system placed restrictions on payment for such goods or services and it was the
suppliers who suffered in the process. Needless to say that this affected the degree of
service ZDF subsequently got from its suppliers.
c. Comment on Case
The principle of commitment control is very sound, although the same
cannot be said of "committed" control. However, putting in place a control system
without enforcing it makes the control ineffective. Maintenance of both commitment and
"committed" controls in their current form results in several non-value adding activities,
and some inefficiency as well. The cost of controls should always be taken into account
when designing systems.
The stop-payment system was introduced because of government's
inability to deal with the absence of financial discipline that resulted in over-expenditure.
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Unfortunately, the system penalizes suppliers and harms ZDF/supplier relationships.
This is a "classic" case of sub-optimization. On the one hand Treasury is credited with
"good" financial management because government does not pay out more than what
Parliament appropriated and on the other, government departments continue to provide
their clients with "good" services. Taken as whole, the system is fraught with
inefficiencies that manifest themselves in huge unpaid supplier bills, poor buyer/supplier
relations, and inability to realize value for money.
4. Case 4: Human Resources
The proportion of the ZDF budget spent on salaries underscores the need to
ensure a good return from investment in human resources. Such benefits can only be
realized if cost/benefit and cost effectiveness analyses are an integral feature of ZDF
policy and practice. The following provide instructive examples of areas where ZDF
policy and practice ignores the value of such analysis: force reduction and redistribution
of funds, training and development costs/benefits, and management practices that
maximize net benefit from human resources.
a. Force Reduction and Redistribution ofFunds
The size of the salaries bill is mainly a function of the numerical strength
of the ZDF. ZDF faces is a major problem in that the portion of the budget that is left
after payment of salaries (approximately 24%) is inadequate to sustain a force capable of
dealing with a major threat to Zimbabwe's security. The proposal to reduce the ZNA
from the current 40, 000 to 25, 000 was prompted by realization of this problem. ZDF
was engaged in such an exercise before, when the ZNA was reduced from 51,000 to 40,
000; but what benefit did it derive from the exercise?
There was no exercise conducted to quantify the costs and benefits of this
exercise, neither has such a study been conducted ahead of the proposals for the second
phase. In the absence of such studies, it is difficult to develop policy that maximizes
benefits of force reduction. It can be argued that even after the reduction of the ZNA to
40,000, the resource situation deteriorated, and conditions of service even got worse. It
appears therefore, that the anticipated redistribution of "savings" realized from manpower
7j
These figures are based on the establishment strength rather than actual figures at the start and end of the
exercise.
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reduction did not achieve the desired effect. Perhaps the benefits of manpower reduction
were subsumed by the escalating cost of goods and services, but in the absence of
economic analysis, this can only remain a guess.
Such reduction usually provides funding opportunities from international
donors (e.g. European Union) to cater for pensions and framing of retrenched soldiers. A
case could also be made for such aid to be extended to modernization (e.g. by provision
of information technology resources) if this will result in future savings from manpower
reductions. After all pressure to reduce the size of the defense force is meant to realize
such savings so that they may be channeled to other sectors of the economy.
b. Training and Development Costs/Benefits
The ZDF also invests a lot of funds in its training and development
programs. These programs are conducted locally and abroad, and involve both civilian
and military courses. ZDF does not, however, keep track of costs of its training programs,
and no major post training and development evaluation program has ever been in force.
Below are specific examples of issues that ZDF could explore to enhance potential
benefit from training and development programs.
Institution of program/mission budgeting would facilitate evaluation of the
costs of alternative training programs relative to objectives to be achieved.
For example, a twelve-week training program conducted in one part of the
country could achieve the same objectives cheaper than a similar program run
over a ten-week period in another, but this would not be apparent in the
absence a specific program budget.
ZDF could aim to maximize benefit through targeted training and
development and appropriate employment of staff. Training and development
requirements should be based on training inventory that takes into account
organizational and individual objectives.
ZDF could encourage a research ethic among its officer corps. Research
could be encouraged on issues that specifically impinge on its capability (e.g.
manpower planning, operations research, information technology, logistic
science, systems management), and aim to reduce or reverse its "professional
lag" behind the civilian sector.
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c. Management Practices to Maximize Net Benefit from Human
Resources
A motivated workforce is an indispensable asset for any successful
organization. In the case of defense forces, the capability for defending national security
interests may well depend on the nature of human resource management practices and
their ability to motivate the force. Major issues that appear problematic in the ZDF, and
are the subject of discussion in this section are career management and conditions of
service.
Career Management. ZDF career management includes a number of
dysfunctional practices resulting from lack of sound policy, or where sound policy is in
place, poor implementation of policy. The following is a sample of problems that
invariably lead to disaffection.
Promotion policy is not consistently applied. For example, the ZNA has a
policy for officers to sit and pass promotion examinations, and/or to have
attended certain courses as prerequisites for promotion. This policy is applied
in some cases and not in others, and for no discernible justification.
In some cases members do not have equal opportunity in selection for
training, promotion, and postings and this may depend on whether you are "in
the right place at the right time". For example if a higher appointment
becomes vacant, not all eligible members may be short-listed for
consideration by the relevant board.
Seniority is not in effect considered as an important factor in considering
members for promotion.
The appraisal system is mainly based on character traits rather than objective
performance criteria.
A policy undertaking to advise members of their next postings in advance
(about six months in advance) has remained a wish despite pronouncements to
that effect at the highest levels.
Lack of sound policies in some cases and poor implementation of "sound"
policies in others may be due to lack of coherent strategy for developing, implementing
and evaluating them. Such a strategy could consider among other issues, improving
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manpower planning skills, application of information technology systems, and
professional management skills. These issues merit unwavering leadership commitment
given the importance ofhuman resources in achieving military missions.
Conditions ofService. Conditions of service have a serious effect on force
motivation and morale. Unfortunately, ZDF members have witnessed deterioration of
their conditions over the years, and in some cases they have to pay for goods and services
which government is supposed to provide. For example, free medical benefits for serving
and retired members and their families have been seriously eroded to the extent that the
"beneficiaries" now rely on private medical facilities for which they have to pay. ZNA
internal audit reports frequently highlight instances where money contributed by soldiers
for their welfare projects is used to buy such things as stationery, fuel, rations, and for
minor repairs of military vehicles due to shortage of government funds for the purpose.
Poor accommodation in most units, shortage of transport, and non-payment of duty travel
and subsistence allowances are also among the problems faced by ZDF members. The
area that receives the most attention is salaries, though it is considered low relative to the
cost of living and where applicable, comparable jobs in the private sector.
Resource constraints are forcing a deterioration of conditions of service.
In addition, this results in lack of equity in the administration of conditions. For example,
members posted to units provided with accommodation are certainly better remunerated
than their counterparts in units without, and who are not compensated for forgoing that
right. Another example is that while all members are entitled to allowances for duty
travel, shortage of funds results in payment being made on the basis of one's rank.
The relevance ofhuman resource management and conditions of service to
the budgetary process is that in addition to being part of the implementation process, they
have a bearing on the return the organization will get from its investment in human and
indeed, other resources. A well-trained, motivated and professional human resource is
more likely to manage other resources economically, efficiently and effectively than a
poorly trained, less motivated, and less professional one.
5. Case 5: Materiel Resources
Management of materiel resources involves capital and non-capital resources.
ZDF has over the years been battling to cope with deteriorating state of its equipment.
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Slow rate of replacement meant that the equipment in service deteriorated at a faster rate.
When new equipment was bought, quantities involved were too insignificant to make any
impact. In fact such equipment would be "overused" to make up for shortfalls, resulting
in a very short life of the new equipment. This situation was exacerbated by poor
equipment management policies. A few examples are given below.
Absence of establishment tables showing what equipment and in what
quantities each unit is entitled to.
Absence of a multi-year planning and programming system for equipment
procurement.
Absence of a "cradle to grave" management policy and life cycle costing.
Emphasis on line-item budgeting and absence of performance criteria to
measure efficiency in resource procurement and utilization.
Failure to conduct economic analyses to determine appropriate levels of
service support (e.g. spares, maintenance and fuel) for the equipment.
Poor management controls resulting in inefficient and ineffective use, and
misuse or abuse of resources.
Resources of a non-capital nature also suffer from poor management practices.
The large number of inventory items and frequency of transactions makes it difficult to
keep track of transactions and produce the management reports necessary for effective
decision-making. Audits conducted frequently highlight numerous instances of inventory
deficiencies mostly due to poor recording of transactions, pilferage and fraud.
The value of information technology in logistics management continues to elude
the ZNA. Computers are currently in limited logistics use at Army HQ, and the bases
and units that deal with materials management and transportation rely on manual
systems. Improvement in logistics management will be hampered by lack of information
technology resources.
Like many other activities, the efficiency of the procurement process has never
been evaluated with a view to improving it. Observations about poor procurement
practices abound, and this is based on evidence of procurement ofwrong items, excessive
quantities, poor quality goods, and poor management of contracts in general. The
problems go beyond procurement to utilization of resources.
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The line item structure of the budget does not allow for evaluation of the
efficiency with which units utilize resources. There is also no deliberate policy for
performance measurement as a basis for monitoring efficiency in resource utilization.
Units are often praised for not exceeding their allocations rather than for efficient
resource utilization.
6. Case 6: General Application of Information Technology
Poor management information systems are a major contributor to ZDF's low
capacity to manage resources efficiently. ZDF is yet to embrace information technology
in a significant way and it lags far behind other organizations, particularly those in the
private sector. As discussed in previous sections, efficiency in areas such as general
administration (and pay and records administration in particular), human resource
management, and logistics could be enhanced through information technology.
The era of relying on centralized mainframe-based processing is quickly getting
to be a thing of the past. Personal Computer (PC) based networks with local processing
capability have replaced the old era but the ZDF still has catch up with this trend. Global
communication trends such as intranet, extranet, internet, and electronic mail are helping
organizations cope with research needs and instant exchange of information
requirements.
Introduction of latest information technology would no doubt require a large
investment of funds. A further complication could be the rate at which technology is
changing. Delayed implementation could result in work of earlier stages becoming
obsolete before completion of the implementation process. These and other problems
call for development of a comprehensive information technology strategy for the
investment to be worth its while.
H. REVIEW
Budget reviews are conducted at these five levels: Parliamentary level, Treasury
level, MOD level, Army/Air HQ levels, and at unit/formation level. The reviews are a




The annual and/or any interim or special reports by the CAG form the basis of
Parliament's review of budget implementation. A Parliamentary committee (Public
Accounts Committee - PAC) is charged with investigating any issues raised by the CAG.
While the Minister of Defense is required to defend the budget on presentation to
Parliament, the Accounting Officer is more involved in explaining any transgressions in
its implementation to the PAC.
The CAG's mandatory annual audits of public accounts are basically "attest"
audits, (i.e. they are meant to certify whether the accounts presented by ministries show a
true and fair view of how the budget was applied). Very few value-for-money (VFM)
audits have been conducted by the department government-wide and in the case ofMOD,
only one is on record.
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Section 7 (b) of the Audit and Exchequer Act states that the
CAG "may carry out examinations into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with
which any Ministry... has used its resources in discharging its functions". These audits
are VFM audits, and the wording of the statute gives the CAG discretion to decide if and
when they are to be conducted.
2. Treasury Review
Review by treasury mainly involves discussions with Ministry officials on the
progress of their respective Appropriation Accounts, and the internal audit function.
These are discussed below.
a. Appropriation Account
The Appropriation Account indicates what the Ministry would have spent
at the time of review in relation to the expected prorated expenditure, and the projected
expenditure to the end of the year in relation to the budget total for the year. Any
variations are discussed and decisions are made on such issues as, instituting further
controls, applying for virements, or applying for supplementary budget appropriation.
Treasury insists on using expenditure figures according to the CPO print-
out (i.e. record of payments made on each item at a given date and balance remaining
from the current year's appropriation), while MOD prefers to use figures based on
74 CAG conducted a VFM audit on the "Provision of (Vehicle) Spares and Equipment to the ZNA
Workshops" in 1994-95. The draft report was discussed in July 1995, and the final report was presented in
March 1997.
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commitments made with suppliers. The CPO print-out does not capture items in transit
such as commitments made for goods/services, whether supplied or not, and these may be
very significant in influencing management decisions. The lengthy, centralized system
for processing payments leads to some of the items in transit remaining unpaid at the end
of the current financial year and being carried forward to the following year. These
"carry-overs" constitute the first charge to the following year's allocation. Carry-overs
impose a serious constraint on the targeted expenditure for the first few months of the
new financial year. Review of the Appropriation Account at least provides indicators of
potential problems and affords the organization an opportunity to take preventive or
corrective action where possible.
b. InternalAudit
Section 18 of the Audit and Exchequer Act empowers Treasury to
"manage and control public moneys and state property". Section 19 of the same Act
provides for the appointment of an internal auditor "to assist Treasury in carrying out the
duties referred to in Section 18". In practice, each Ministry has an internal audit
department that has a dual reporting responsibility, first to the Accounting Officer of the
Ministry concerned and then to Treasury.
Internal auditors carry out their audits on the basis of annual plans agreed
to between them, and the Accounting Officer and Treasury. In some cases though, they
are required to carry out investigative audits. They report their observations to the
commanders of the ZNA and AFZ as the case may be, the Accounting Officer, Treasury
and the CAG. The latter may, and often does, use internal audit report findings to
support the annual report to Parliament.
3. Ministry of Defense (MOD) Review
Review at MOD level also involves the appropriation account and internal audit.
The Appropriation Account review at this level considers expenditures recorded at four
levels (i.e. CPO, MOD, ZNA/AFZ HQ finance departments, and ZNA/AFZ purchasing
departments). Each of these levels would reflect different "expenditure" figures. The
differences are accounted for by requisitions in transit. The value of requisitions in
transit may be an indicator of inefficient processing on the part of some departments, and
review enables corrective action to be taken. It is also at MOD level that some virements
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are authorized and recommendations for Treasury virements endorsed, and the
Appropriation Account review facilitates such decisions.
As indicated under Treasury reviews, MOD has an internal audit department. The
department provides the Accounting Officer with reports on how the services are
implementing and accounting for the budget. There is also an audit committee at MOD
that reviews all CAG and MOD Internal Audit reports and responses thereto. The Audit
Committee reviews are made to ensure that audit concerns are effectively dealt with by
the respective heads of departments and units/formations audited, and to recommend to
the accounting officer measures to improve accounting in MOD.
4. Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)/Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ)
Headquarters Review
The appropriation account is also a valuable tool for review at this level. In
addition to this, each service has its own internal audit department, and may constitute
boards or committees to look into various aspects of budget implementation.
The finance departments carry out the Appropriation Account review in
conjunction with vote controllers. Vote-controllers include heads of departments and
directorates at Army and Air HQs and some unit/formation commanders. Although some
budget items are "decentralized" for implementation purposes, they might be under the
control of directorates that are based at Army/Air HQ. Such directorates however, are
represented at unit/formation HQs. Unit/formation commanders are normally represented
at the Appropriation Account review meetings by the finance officers attached to them.
The internal audit departments for each service have a responsibility to provide
the service commanders with appraisals on the state of accounting in the various units. In
addition to auditing public funds, ZNA and AFZ internal audit departments have
responsibility for auditing non-public funds. 7
Review may also be made by through boards or committees set up to audit,
inquire into, or investigate specific issues raised on implementation of the budget.
Boards or committees may be routine (e.g. audit boards required by Accounting
Standing Orders) or ad hoc as stated above.
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Vote controllers is the term used for officers with responsibility for managing specific items or sub-items
within the budget.
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Non-public funds are funds contributed by individual members for welfare and recreation purposes.
77
5. Formation/Unit Review
The reviews carried at the above levels affect units and formations. In the process
of audits, units get invaluable feedback on how they fare in terms of their ability to
account for public resources. For many years the standard of accounting in ZDF was
very poor as audit reports testify. For this reason auditors were viewed with resentment
and could not therefore get the cooperation necessary for "successful" audits.
Appropriation Accounts are also reviewed at this level, but only where budget
items are decentralized. Review provides commanders with a useful tool to control their
activities and gives them valuable input for any representations on resource problems
they may wish to make to higher headquarters. Some major units/ formations have audit
sections, and units/formations may constitute boards, verification teams etc. for the
purpose of providing evidence on how the budget is being implemented.
I. SURVEY RESULTS
Two surveys were conducted to identify problems or source of problems in the
current budgetary process. One was among legislators and the other among key players
within ZDF itself. Major observations relating to each survey are discussed below.
1. Legislators' Opinion Survey
The survey questionnaire identified the purpose of the survey as "to identify areas
where the (ZDF) budget process can be improved to meet the challenges of
modernization in a constrained economy". Three major factors motivated the idea of
seeking legislators' opinion on this subject. First, the constitution vests the authority to
appropriate public funds to various government programs in the legislators. In principle,
it may be assumed that the level of funding for defense relative to other spending
programs is, from the legislators' point of view, the optimal level of allocation consistent
with ZDF's requirements for safeguarding Zimbabwe's national interests. Second, it is
generally acknowledged that the budget is a major instrument in the exercise of civilian
authority over the military.
Zimbabwe has provision for 1 50 legislators. Survey questionnaires were mailed
to all registered legislators as at April 1998. Respondents were requested to return the
completed questionnaires at least two weeks from the date of receipt but only 20 had
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responded after six weeks from the date of receipt. Of these, three returned them
uncompleted and were therefore considered as "no opinions".
Except for one question where legislators' opinion was sought on the proportion
ofGDP that defense spending could be allowed to achieve the modernization goals in the
next ten years, questions were "multiple choice" type and required only one selection. In
some cases legislators did not indicate their opinion and in a few others, despite an
instruction to the contrary, they selected more than one. These were therefore considered
as "no opinion" although no specific provision had been made for this particular
response.
a. Observations
Most Important Peace-Time Rolefor the Defense Forces. The majority of
respondents (seven) agreed that, "building capacity to counter future threats" was the
most important peace-time role of the defense forces. Five "no opinions" were recorded.
The other roles: internal security operations, military aid to civil ministries, participation
in peace-keeping operations and running self-reliance projects received support from
three or less respondents each.
ZDF Modernization as Priority. Eight respondents rated modernization of
the ZDF, "compared to other competing national goals" as a "high priority" issue while
six rated it as a "priority issue". Three thought it was "not a priority" issue while the
other three were recorded as "no opinions".
Proportion ofDefense Spending to GDP. Respondents were asked to state
their opinion on, "the minimum level of defense expenditure that (they) estimate should
be allowed in order to achieve...the goal to modernize ZDF without jeopardizing other
national security goals". Six "no opinions" were recorded, and the other opinions ranged
from 1% to 60%. Seven were between 1% and 5%, two were 10%, and the other were
20%, 25%, 30%, and 60%.
Source ofMajor Funding for the Modernization Program. The majority
(ten) opinion was that major funding should come from normal government revenue. A
close seven thought that it should be funded "from revenues from the state owned defense
industries". Three "no opinions" were recorded.
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Participation in Defense Policy Formulation. Nine respondents thought
that participants in defense policy formulation should be, "the legislature and executive
only" while four thought this should be the prerogative of "the executive only". Only
three said that participants should be, "all citizens and interest/civic groups", and one said
"all citizens in their private capacities" should participate. Three "no opinions" were
recorded.
Current Parliamentary Involvement in Defense Matters. Six respondents
were happy with their current involvement in defense matters. Nine thought it should be
increased while one thought it should be reduced slightly. Three "no opinions" were
recorded.
Standard of Accounting in the Defense Forces. Legislators were asked
their opinion on the standard of accounting in the defense forces compared to other
ministries. Seven thought that it was "inferior"; one thought it was "slightly inferior";
five thought it was "about the same"; two thought that it was "slightly superior"; and one
thought it was "superior". Three "no opinions" were recorded.
Major Weakness in the Management of Public Resources. Most
respondents (ten) identified "poor procurement practices" as the major weakness in ZDF's
management of public resources. Five identified the weakness as "poor management of
human resources" while one identified, "poor management of consumable resources".
Three no opinions" were recorded.
Improvements from the Three-Year Rolling Budget. Legislators were
asked if "introduction of the three-year rolling budget system had helped (them) to
improve their management of the national purse". Eight did not see any change; two said
there was a slight improvement while two said there was a significant improvement.
Three "no opinions" were recorded.
b. Comment
Some pertinent comments can be made from the above feedback. The
response to the survey was very poor (i.e. 13.3%). In the absence of a follow-up study,
guesses as to the cause could be misleading. Time and distance were major constraining
factors in this study and so no follow-up could be made. Though response was poor,
certain patterns emerged. However, it would be unreasonable to assume that such
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patterns are a reflection of the "general thinking" of Zimbabwe's legislature given the
small percentage of the survey returned.
The majority opinion of those returning the survey is that ZDF's most
important role in peace-time is to enhance its capacity to defend any future threats to
Zimbabwe's national interests. Collectively though, more respondents (thirteen compared
with seven) had different views or assigned equal importance to a number of roles. For
obvious reasons, the military's view would favor the first argument which is also
consistent with the NDP, and the results of this survey indicate different perspectives
about the most important roles of the military in peace-time. Without discounting the
invariability of divergent views on such issues, it could reasonably be argued that lack of
participation of the legislators in formulation of current NDP, and poor "stake-holder
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education" programs" by ZDF account for the lack of a common position on the issue.
This observation is important for ZDF's strategic planning process, particularly with
regard to mobilizing resources for its modernization program.
Respondents generally agreed that the ZDF modernization program rates
highly among other competing national security goals. There were differences on the
sources of funding for such a program and on the level of defense expenditure relative to
GDP. The major sources were identified as "normal government revenue", and "revenue
from state owned defense industries". Given that normal government revenue is
currently "failing" to sustain ZDF, a case for alternative sources of revenue including
"revenue from state owned defense industries" appears to be persuasive.
Defense policy can be an important factor in resolving or reconciling
different perceptions on defense matters. Most respondents were of the view that defense
policy formulation should be the prerogative of "the legislature and executive only". The
current NDP (which was prepared without general involvement of the legislators) instead
urges wide consultation with the public in general on defense matters. The latter position
augurs well for more transparency and reconciling public opinion on the value of defense
expenditure in furthering national security and the perception that it is an unnecessary
application of resources that could otherwise be applied to other welfare programs.
77 ZDF has a Public Relations Department that could be responsible for such programs. It is, however,
seriously constrained in terms ofresources to the extent that it cannot regularly publish internal newsletters
and or journals.
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Given this argument, it would be logical to present the NDP as a "white paper" to elicit
contributions by the general public.
Most respondents also argued for more parliamentary involvement in
defense matters. Currently their involvement is mainly in the appropriation of the
defense budget and reviewing budget implementation issues reported by CAG. With
respect to the latter, the overwhelming view by the respondents is that the standard of
accounting in ZDF is inferior to the standards of other ministries. They also identified
"poor procurement practices" as the major weakness in ZDF's management of public
resources. These observations do not bode well for an organization that is clamoring for
more resources to be put at its disposal. ZDF leadership therefore needs to take measures
to redress these concerns if the organization is to win affective support for its programs.
The final issue respondents were asked to provide an opinion on was the
effectiveness of the "three year rolling budget" system. Most respondents said there had
not noticed any change since introduction of the system. It can be argued that it is rather
too early for the system to have made a significant impact. The importance of evaluating
the system cannot be over emphasized. On its part, the ZDF would benefit from
conducting an independent evaluation on the value of the three-year rolling budget
system in a defense environment, and making recommendations consistent with reforms
suggested in this thesis.
2. ZDF Officers' Survey
The second survey was conducted among ZDF officers appointed as formation
commanders, commanding officers and/or vote-controllers. Out of seventy
questionnaires that were mailed to respondents, thirty-five responses were received. The
purpose of the survey was, "to identify strengths and weaknesses of the ZDF budgetary
process with a view to making positive changes". The respondents were selected on the
basis that they provided the input for budget formulation and were responsible for
implementation of the budget. Their day to day experience with the process places them
in a better position to articulate problems encountered especially at the operating level.
Questions asked were related to general policy aspects of the budget, its
formulation and negotiation, implementation, and review. Budgeting for revenue was
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also of interest given the need to mobilize resources. Major observations from each of
these categories are highlighted and comments made below.
a. Observations
General Policy. The major issues canvassed under this heading were the
respondents' knowledge of ZDF's strategy to deal with the general shortage of resources,
and their understanding of ZDF's vision for the future. This is important because any
attempts to redress ZDF's current problems, and the desire to create the defense forces
espoused in the NDP cannot be realized without active involvement of the officers in the
respondents' capacities.
The respondents were asked whether they were aware of, "ZDF's long-
term strategy to deal with the current general shortage of resources". Twenty-two said
they were aware while thirteen said they were not. Those who responded in the
affirmative were further asked to state the strategy in brief. Most identified "downsizing"
as the strategy that ZDF had adopted to deal with the problem. Others offered more of
what they thought should be done rather than a deliberate strategy that the organization
had adopted. Their suggestions included streamlining procurement procedures, adopting
measures to improve accountability and resource management, matching resources to
tasks, prioritizing projects, and manpower development.
In response to the question whether they were aware of "ZDF's vision for
its modernization program", seventeen said they were, fifteen said they were not, and
three said the concept of "vision " was not clear to them. The theme of "a small, well-
equipped, well managed, and effective force" was prevalent in the statements of ZDF's
vision. In three instances emphasis was on the "creation of two regional commands",
while the element of a reserve force to back-up the small regular force was mentioned in
only one response.
Budget Formulation and Negotiation. Two major issues merit
consideration. First is the setting of objectives for the forthcoming fiscal year. This was
meant to identify whether the budgetary process was objective-driven or not, and whether
staff had adequate guidance to engage in effective budget formulation or not. Second, the
survey sought to identify if respondents were given the opportunity to engage in
negotiations that required them to justify their estimates. This would indicate how
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effective the budgetary process was in taking into account requirements and concerns of
the lower levels of the organization.
Only five respondents said that, "clear and largely attainable"
objectives/goals were provided by higher headquarters/authority. The majority (fifteen)
agreed that clear objectives/goals were given, but they were "largely unattainable". Three
said the objectives were not clear, another ten said "objectives/goals (were) not
provided", and two made no comment. In response to another question, twenty-two
respondents said that they, "always... set specific objectives /goals to be achieved by
(their subordinate units or staff) in the next fiscal year".
Nine respondents confirmed that they were "always" given the opportunity
to justify their estimates, four said "often", thirteen said "sometimes", eight said they
were not given that opportunity, and one did not comment. All respondents except for
the latter confirmed that the estimates they provided were always reduced when presented
to higher headquarters/authority.
Budget Implementation. Respondents were asked to identify the, "most
well-managed (or least mismanaged) resources" and the, "most mismanaged (or least
well-managed) resources" among consumables, physical (non-consumable) assets, and
human resources. Management's ability to identify critical problems puts them in a better
position to focus attention on the most deserving issues in implementing the budget.
Their ranking of the most well-managed (or least mismanaged) resources
was, in descending order, human resources, physical assets, and consumables. Physical
assets were ranked as the most mismanaged (or least well-managed) resources, followed
by consumables and then human resources.
Review. ZDF has its own internal audit functions, one under ZNA and the
other under AFZ. This is in addition to audit services provided by CAG and MOD audit
departments. No formal evaluation of the effectiveness of the ZDF audit function was
ever carried out. Respondents were asked to rate the latter's effectiveness in relation to
that of CAG and MOD auditors. In addition, they were asked to rank the major
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Standards for the Practice of Internal Auditing require that internal audit departments be evaluated by
independent, qualified persons at least once in every three years so as to provide quality assurance. Formal
internal quality assurance reviews should be conducted more frequently.
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contributing factors to accounting problems observed by auditors in the course of their
reviews.
The majority (thirteen) indicated that they did not have a strong opinion on
which of the three audit departments was the most effective. Eight thought MOD internal
audit was the most effective, and seven respondents each vouched for CAG and ZDF
auditors.
Concerning factors that contributed most to qualified reports by auditors,
respondents ranked them as follows in order of most-to-least contribution: employment
of unqualified personnel in accounting functions, poor supervision by unit management,
poor staffing (manpower strength), and lack of motivation to do the job properly.
Budgeting for Revenue. Respondents were also asked if they were
required to submit revenue estimates, and to identify areas with high potential for revenue
generation- Only five were required to provide revenue estimates and the other thirty-
five were not. Sale of redundant assets was identified as the area with the most potential
for revenue generation. Suggestions were also made for other potential revenue
generating activities such as; farming, running garrison shops, engaging in money
generating sporting activities, leasing facilities (unused capacity) such as workshops,
leasing aircraft (charter), conducting air shows and displays, and providing medical
services. Participation in peacekeeping operations and "defense industry" were also
suggested as major potential revenue generators. ZDF could also "mobilize financial
resources" indirectly through cost avoidance, in particular by sticking to its core
activities.
Fundamental Changes to Budget Process. The final issue canvassed was
the respondents' opinions on, "the single most important thing that needs to be changed in
the ZDF budgetary process in order to realize a significant improvement in the
management of resources". This question elicited a variety of responses and the
"significant" problems highlighted in the process are listed below:
Poor strategic planning and the absence of clear vision.
Plans are not linked to resources required for implementation.
There are no clear objectives for both the short-term and long-term.
Notwithstanding lack of clarity, objectives are not linked to the budget.
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There is no clear identification of priorities.
Lack of consistency in policy implementation.
The budget is incremental and not based on programs. Specific terms used for
"programs" include "activities, tasks, results, and projects".
The budgetary process does not adapt to changes in the economy.
Poor consultation with and lack of feedback to the lowest levels of the
organization.
Poor accountability.
Unavailability of manuals to guide the budget implementation process.
Lack ofmanagement training and poor placement ofhuman resources.
b. Comment
Respondents identified downsizing as the prevalent factor in ZDF's
strategy to deal with the resources problem as well as in the articulation of its vision. The
high incidence of officers who were "ignorant" of ZDF's strategy (37%) and ZDF's vision
(43%), and the differences in the understanding of the "vision" among those who said
they were aware of it, are probably indicators ZDF's failure to articulate strategy and
vision. From this argument therefore, one of ZDF's major challenges is its ability to
engage in a strategic planning process that involves all key stake-holders to engender a
common sense of purpose.
There is a danger of entrenching "downsizing" as the panacea to ZDF's
problems, both current and in the future as appears to be the trend. This trend inhibits
strategic planning thought and creates a sense of hopelessness when the perceived
benefits of downsizing cannot be realized. ZNA's previous experience with downsizing
is a case in point. In any case, even if the organization engages in downsizing, this would
not obviate the need for economic, efficient and effective management of resources, and
the current economic environment dictates that innovative strategies be found to achieve
that end.
The general lack of consensus on whether the budget formulation is
preceded by clear objectives from higher headquarters/authority is testimony to a
problem in the objective setting process. Assuming that the statement by the majority of
respondents that, "clear goals were given but even though they were largely unattainable"
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is the most accurate position, then the goals are reduced "wish lists" that are not matched
with resources to accomplish them. Consequently, they are rolled from one year to the
next, and intervening changes in priorities tend to blur whatever perception of ZDF's
"vision" that they might have.
Respondents believed that the area that needs the most attention in better
resource management is management of physical assets (e.g. motor vehicles, aircraft, and
equipment). There was a general feeling that human resources were better managed than
were physical assets and consumables. It should be stressed that evaluation was based on
relativity among the three resource categories. Evidence from the survey does not
necessarily mean that either is well-managed or mismanaged in absolute terms. As this
thesis has already argued, there are resource management problems across-the-board, and
this survey highlights the relative concerns among the areas that need more attention.
The effectiveness ZDF's internal audit resources were generally ranked as
equally effective with CAG and MOD auditors. An argument might be made for
improving effectiveness of local resources on the basis that they have better knowledge
of potential problems in the organization and should therefore be capable of providing
more assistance to ZDF management.
The need to improve staff qualifications or to employ qualified people in
positions that require accounting skills was highlighted. However, paying attention to
accounting only would lead to sub-optimal results. This thesis argues that for the entire
budgetary process to improve, qualifications should be improved across the board.
Efforts to achieve this "in the past eighteen years" by improving qualifications internally
did not achieve the desired results. There is need to evolve a strategy to achieve this goal
otherwise the well-intended efforts to modernize would still come to naught.
Inadequate attention has, over the years, been paid to budgeting for
revenue. This was probably due to the mistaken belief that it was "government's
responsibility" to generate the revenue, and that organizations such as defense were only
responsible for implementing spending programs. If one respondent's view that, "we
(ZDF) are not a profit making body which should deal with revenue issues" is an
indication of attitudes that still prevail among key players in the budgetary process, then a
case for urgent staff reorientation is justified. The Government's inability to adequately
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fund its programs is in part due to a mismatch between revenue and expenditure, and
efficiency by ministries in generating revenue as provided for by law will go a long way
to alleviate such problems. The assumption of course is that the much talked about
profligacy would not account for any additional revenue generated.
There are no clear performance parameters for revenue collection, and
there is lack of feedback and incentives for engaging in such an exercise. At
headquarters level, institution of the Defense Procurement Fund into which proceeds
from sale of redundant assets would be paid, for example, introduced a major incentive
for managing assets to best advantage. A program of incentives (e.g. ploughing back
revenue to units) merits ZDF leadership attention in its quest to improve management of
resources and mobilize resources for its modernization effort. In addition, other areas
suggested by the respondents above deserve attention, but decision on the courses of
action should consider the need to avoid detracting ZDF from its primary mission, and
should in fact contribute to enhancing capability.
Respondents also identified "critical issues" that need to be addressed in
order to improve management of resources in ZDF. The listed issues are discussed in
more detail elsewhere in this thesis. It suffices to point out at this stage that the
organization has abundant ideas on issues that need resolution, and the challenge is on
ZDF leadership is to evolve effective and committed strategies to deal with them.
The results of the survey vindicate the thesis' concern for the need to
reengineer the budget process if it is to effectively contribute to modernization of the
ZDF. The next chapter will deal with specific issues on the ZDF budgetary process that
would benefit from such an approach.
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V. REENGINEERING THE ZDF BUDGETARY PROCESS
The challenges facing ZDF are enormous. Funds provided for defense at the
current force level are barely adequate, let alone the additional funding required for its
modernization program. Its current resource management practices are unlikely to
withstand the pressure of such challenges, hence the need to take bold steps to reengineer
the budget process. This will not be an easy process given the fact that its system relies
heavily on a government budgetary system that is centralized, inflexible, and
conservative in its reforms.
This thesis emphases a holistic approach to reforming the budgetary process. The
budgetary process goes beyond allocating what is available and spending it. It has to do
with mobilization of resources, allocating them efficiently, using them economically,
efficiently and effectively, and in the final analysis, being accountable for the results.
Chapters II and III laid the theoretical foundation to put analysis of ZDF's
budgetary process (Chapter IV) into proper perspective. This chapter analyses
opportunities for improvement that the current system presents, and the prospects for
implementing process reengineering to achieve "dramatic improvements". Discussion
will be under the following headings:
Policy and Institutional Improvements.
Selected Process Improvements.
Reengineering Approach to Improvements.
A. POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS
The objective of the NDP is to ensure that the nation is capable of defending its
national interests against foreign and domestic threat. This does not preclude the
requirement for defense to compete for scarce national resources on the pretext of the
"life and death" character of national survival. Downs and Larkey would argue that
seeking to rely on such pretext would be "an exercise of self-delusion".
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Downs, George W and Larkey, Patrick D The Search for Government Efficiency (Temple University
Press: Philadelphia, 1986) 1 st ed 153.
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Is modernization necessary and sustainable given the prevailing relative peace and
a hostile economic environment? The first part of the question is easy. There is no doubt
that military forces with the highest technology rather than numerical strength will
dominate the future battlefield. Motivation will not come from the soldiers' preparedness
"to die for the country" in the face of the adversary's devastating technology, but from the
confidence that the nation has endowed them with the highest possible technology.
The second part is more vexing. A sound economy is required in order to have a
strong defense and the converse is also true. The current state of Zimbabwe's economy is
far from "sound", and unless innovative ways to mobilize resources are developed, its
ability to sustain an extensive modernization program is therefore questionable if not
improbable. While the need to modernize may be easy to embrace depending on
knowledge of the country's current military capability, is unlikely that the political will to
prop up defense spending from its current level can be garnered. This poses an enormous
challenge on the ZDF leadership.
ZDF leadership will need to evolve strategies for dealing with this challenge.
Mere introspection without taking concrete steps will result in the situation deteriorating
to an extent where the ZDF is unable to fulfill its mission. This section of the thesis
makes suggestions for dealing with some of the pertinent policy and institution related
issues. These will be discussed under the broad headings of: Defense Capability as a
Development Agenda, and Strategic Management Approach.
1. Defense Capability as a "Development Agenda"
The first challenge is to put the military on the "development agenda". The
argument that government alone cannot afford to fund defense modernization in any
significant way without adverse consequences to the economy, and considerable political
risk seems quite persuasive. Right now government is pre-occupied with development
issues, and despite problems in meeting development targets, its comprehensive
development plans bear testimony to this commitment. Defense, however, does not
feature in any of these plans. It would be prudent to include defense in development
plans on account of the following:
Defense is the second largest spender of the national budget. For this reason it
is a significant factor in the process of allocating national resources.
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Modernization of the defense forces involves huge investment in imported
high technology equipment and weapon systems. The drain on foreign
currency resources that the modernization program will entail is likely to be
unsustainable. Putting defense on the development agenda with particular
focus on research and development aimed at developing local industry
capacity to produce some of the equipment could result in benefits of
OA
"affordable defense" and employment creation among others. Public
support for defense programs is likely to be engendered by perceived and
tangible benefits to the population.
The first step towards inclusion in the development agenda is to ensure that the
NDP goes further than specifying military objectives, and specifies the means to achieve
them. This will entail identifying major programs to be undertaken and the required
financial commitment. The current NDP falls short in this respect.
The effectiveness of the above approach rests on the premise that the input of all
citizens, individual or corporate, would have been taken into account in the defense
policy formulation process. The NDP in fact acknowledges the need for public
involvement in the defense policy formulation process, although this has never been put
Q 1
into practice. The proposition for a "smart partnership" between the defense sector and
private enterprise may be a viable option to mobilize resources for the defense
modernization program. Under this scenario, the ZDF should not expect that resources
will be mobilized through "donations". Financial resources will instead be mobilized
through improvement of ZDF systems so that the cost of supplying defense materiel is
minimized, joint conduct of research and development for the long term mutual benefit,
and obviating rent seeking in procurement of goods and services through transparency.
Approaching the budgetary process from a strategic perspective creates an
environment in which all stakeholders feel the need to contribute to the achievement of
the mission to defend national interests. Approach to the whole budgetary process would
80 The NDP undertakes to support this endeavor.
81 The NDP acknowledges that ZDF is "a national institution that relies on public support and public funds"
and that "consultations will foster accountability and openness in government's dealings related to defense
issues".
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also benefit from a strategic planning approach, and suggestions for this approach are
discussed below.
2. Strategic Management Approach
The NDP provides a broad set of objectives. As already argued the means to
achieve these objectives is not specified. This is compounded by the fact that ZDF
operates in a dynamic and competitive social, political and economic environment
fraught with uncertainties. Such an environment dictates the institution of a strategic
planning process. The benefits that would accrue to ZDF may be summed up as
follows:
It will help to identify strategic issues facing ZDF and force its leadership to
take specific focused action.
Properly instituted, the process will engender a culture of strategic thought
and action that permeates the entire organization.
It will enhance communication between higher and lower levels within the
hierarchy and provide a rallying point for dealing with organizational
problems.
Improved performance will result as a product of the above benefits.
In the absence of a strategic planning process, ZDF will continue to rely on an
assortment of policies that are fragmented and some times contradictory. Bryson aptly
captures this dilemma facing many government or public agencies as he observes that:
Unfortunately, very few governments, public agencies, or non-profit
organizations think as long and hard as this about what they want to do and for
whom, why, and how. Nor do many condense their thinking into a grand strategy.
As a result, there is usually little more than an odd assortment of policies or goals
that guide decision making and action in pursuit of organizational purposes. In
the absence of deliberate or emergent overall strategic direction, the sum of the
organization's parts can be expected to add up to something less than a whole. 3
82 Drawing on Olsen and Eadie, Bryson, John M. Strategic Planning for Public and Non-profit
Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, Jossey-Bass
Publishers; San Francisco, 1995, defines strategic planning as "a disciplined effort to produce fundamental
decisions and actions that shape what an organization is, what it does and why it does it". (4, 5)
"Bryson, 135.
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The suggestion here is for ZDF to release itself from this trap and embrace the
strategic planning process. To "kick-start" this process, a seminar on the topic could be
arranged for ZDF's top management in which the benefit of academic wisdom from
strategic planning scholars, and the benefit of planning experience from practitioners
from different organizations might be exploited. An in-house forum could then be
organized to lay the foundation for strategic planning in the ZDF. Embracing the
strategic planning process would provide a good foundation for improving other
processes within the broad budgetary framework.
B. SELECTED PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS
It should be clear by now that the range of processes constituting the ZDF
budgetary process as defined in this thesis are wide and varied. This section identifies
some of the processes that arguably merit immediate attention, and serve to illustrate the
potential for improvement through process reengineering. Specifically the following will
be addressed:
Budgeting system for the ZDF.
Resource management.
Use of information technology.
Elimination of non-value adding activities.
1. Budgeting System for ZDF
Budget reform has over the years been shifting from a traditional incremental to
an objective based systems approach and from a control to a performance focus. The
result of this evolution has been hybrid systems that eliminated weaknesses of the past
while instituting newer techniques that would hopefully result in improvement in the
management of scarce resources. Recurring features in contemporary government
budgeting systems are: determination of clear objectives, long range planning,
identification of alternative programs and selection based on cost/benefit and cost
effectiveness analysis, and using performance as a basis for structuring the budget and
measuring performance.
93
a. The Current System
The ZDF budget process is also a combination of different budget
systems, in particular incremental and ZBB systems. There is no published policy on the
system in use and the systems can only be inferred from the way budget activities are
conducted. It should be noted however, that its version of ZBB differs in significant
respects with the ZBB process discussed in Chapter II. For example, there are no
objectives that are specifically linked with the budgetary process for each level of
responsibility, and programs are not evaluated at different levels of resource allocation
and performance.
In general, the ZDF budgetary process is characterized by fragmented and
ineffective short-range planning, absence of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses
in the selection of projects to be undertaken, lack of performance evaluation measures,
and a general environment that is not conducive to innovation. The system also does not
engender enthusiastic participation of lower level key players in the budget formulation
and implementation process.
ZDF has recognized the problem of short-range planning which has been a
source of major weakness particularly for its procurement programs. Evidence of this
recognition is the institution of the Programs Branch at ZDF HQ. The effectiveness of
this department however, will depend on a number of factors including ZDF leadership
commitment to a strategic planning process and appropriate human resource availability.
General concern for improving ZDF management of resources and
institution of the Programs Department may signal the need to move towards PPBS,
although the system nomenclature could be different. Whether this is the case or not, the
argument has been made that PPBS would be an attractive system to deal with ZDF
budgetary problems. It would therefore be instructive to evaluate how the ZDF's current
system compares with PPBS. The US Department of Defense PPBS, on which the
discussion in this thesis is based, provides a convenient model for the purpose. The
evaluation is restricted to the general framework consistent with the scope of this thesis.
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b. PPBS Versus Current ZDFSystem
Details of the PPBS have been discussed in Chapter II. Reference will
therefore be made to the outcome of each phase to determine how it relates to the ZDF
system.
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The planning phase of PPBS
involves identification of national interests, examination of world security environment,
defining national military strategy, and planning force structure. The phase culminates in
the Secretary of Defense issuing a DPG to the services. The DPG provides the services
with, among other things, major policy issues, guidance on force planning, and resource
planning and fiscal guidance. Programming is then based on such guidance.
In the ZDF process, involvement of the Minister of Defense (equivalent to
Secretary of Defense) does not culminate in the issue of a formal planning guidance as
the DPG. ZDF relies on policy as it evolves through regular and ad hoc meetings
between the civilian and military leadership. There is no coherent planning document
(that includes national military strategy and policy to support the strategy) that is
available to key players in the budget process. Traditionally, ZDF is a very "security
sensitive" organization, and information necessary for effective resource planning and
management might thus be classified beyond the security clearance of some of the key
players in the budget process.
The programming system that ZDF is in the process of introducing is
centralized at MOD (ZDF HQ). This is in contrast with the PPBS system where planning
guidance is given at MOD (equivalent) level, and programming is carried out by the
respective services. Policy is thus set at the higher level for implementation at the lower
level. The size of the ZDF might provide a good argument for centralized programming
of major equipment, but this might constrain the service commanders in selecting the
combination of programs on which their success will be evaluated. If the latter argument
is accepted, then there is merit to consider programming at service level, while MOD
would provide general policy and preside over a "programming board" to review and
confirm the appropriate programs. Programming at service level will also be inevitable if
the program and /or mission budgeting system as discussed in this thesis is embraced.
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Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The programming phase
involves the preparation ofPOM by the services. Information from the DPG is translated
into program packages, and programs are developed to cover a six-year period. Selection
of programs is based on rationally developed analyses that provide justification/evidence
of the efficient utilization of public resources. Service programs are then consolidated
into JPAM, before submission for program decision by the DPRB, chaired by the
Secretary of Defense.
ZDF has no experience in programming and is only starting to embark on
such a system. Prior to government's introduction of the three-year rolling budget
system, ZDF financial planning was done on an annual basis. Planning problems
manifested themselves in procurement projects not being completed and items procured
not making a significant improvement in enhancing capability. Implementation of
program or mission-based budgeting will assist in improving resource planning and
management, but if and only if its introduction is managed properly.
Budget Guidance Manual. Approved programs are then budgeted for.
This stage is necessary to relate programs to financial resources available each year, and
facilitate adjustment of the future years POM. Offices responsible for submitting budget
estimates are guided by the BGM.
The ZDF budget process does not give adequate guidance to vote-
controllers, (i.e. there is no equivalent of BGM) consequently submissions of estimates
vary to the extent that the magnitude of adjustments made to the estimates make a
mockery ofthe process, at least from the vote-controllers' point of view.
General Observations. PPBS is an objectives-based system that relies on
rational analysis in the selection of programs. The process provides guidance to players
at each stage, and hearings are conducted to confirm program justification. This forces
decision-makers at each level to focus on organizational goals and gives them valuable
feedback on which to base future plans.
Civilian authority over the military is further articulated through the PPBS
process. Responsibility for civilian control of the military goes beyond mere
subordination in terms of taking orders, and is asserted in terms of providing resources
for the military.
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ZDF could benefit from introducing of PPBS. Introduction of such a far
reaching system should be preceded by a strategy that would take into account changing
the organizational culture and building capacity to achieve an efficient and effective
system. A strategic planning process would also enable ZDF to canvass the question of
how best civilian control could benefit ZDF at the resource provision level.
2. Resource Management
It was pointed out earlier that the capability of the defense forces to meet their
mission depends to a great extent on their staying power; their ability to sustain a force in
combat over a long period of time. Resource planning and management is a key factor in
achieving this capability. ZDF resource management is an area with great potential for,
in reengineering parlance, "dramatic improvement". The inadequacy of financial
resources restricts the level of acquisition of other resources, and this calls for innovative
ways to obtain more value from existing resources, and to improve the process of
acquiring new resources. The discussion in Chapter IV raised some issues that ZDF
needs to pay attention to if it is to realize optimum benefit from its resource management.
This section pays particular attention to improvement in human resource management
practices and institution ofprogram or mission based budgeting.
a. Human Resource Management Practices
The detailed discussion ofhuman resource management practices points to
a failure of the organization to optimize benefits from its most important resource. It is
worth reiterating that good human resource management will have positive spin-off
effects on the management of resources.
The intention of ZDF's manpower reduction programs is to release more
funds for needy areas such as procurement of equipment and other logistic resources.
This is in keeping with the intention to achieve "a small, well-trained and equipped
professional defense force". Previous manpower reduction plans did not quantify the
expected monetory savings, and neither did the post-reduction evaluation. Consequently,
the expected savings could not be specifically targeted to a spending program. From an
ordinary soldier's point of view the exercise merely cushioned the effects of further
budget reduction, because resource availability and conditions of service got poorer.
There is no doubt that reduction programs result in significant savings, but ifZDF cannot
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identify them in precise terms and specifically target them, it will be unable to maximize
benefits as intended.
ZDF manpower statistics in general, are poorly maintained. One area that
suffers from this problem is the evaluation of benefits from training and development
programs. As the single most important activity for ZDF during peace time, there is need
to keep track of training and development costs. The budget should also be structured in
a way that identifies allocations to training. In this manner, it will be clear to the public
for example, that ZDF is spending money on specified training programs and not simply
on its sustenance in barracks. On its part, ZDF would be better able to compare costs
with benefits.
The thesis also identified problems in ZDF's human resource practices.
Major areas of concern are career management practices and conditions of service. The
importance of these to morale cannot be over emphasized. A trend towards "a smaller,
less motivated force" appears to be unfolding and this is certainly not in keeping with a
modernized professional force, and it compromises readiness as defined in this thesis.
Poor career management practices are a result of a number of factors.
Among these are poor policies, poor implementation of good policies, and lack of
management commitment. These problems are exacerbated by poor management
information systems on which to base decisions. Solutions to these problems lie
primarily in management's commitment to change, which ironically has been identified
as a problem itself. From a strategic planning process point of view, the human resource
problems qualify as strategic issues which can be dealt with as such ifZDF embraces the
strategic planning process to seek solutions to its problems.
As for conditions of service, they have continued on a deteriorating trend.
It was hoped that by moving towards a smaller ZDF, conditions of service would
improve, but as already argued above, ZDF's planning system does not specifically target
savings from manpower reduction to specified programs. Benefits to conditions of
service, if any, might only therefore be incidental.
b. Program/Mission-Based Budgeting
The line-item based budgeting system does not afford ZDF the
opportunity to evaluate cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness in executing its programs
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relative to its missions. The absence of performance-based criteria for managing
resources is also an impediment to efficiency in ZDF's quest to get the most value out of
limited financial resources.
At the equipment procurement level, focus on costs should go beyond
"landed costs" to "life-cycle costs". Such costs should be taken into account in the
proposed multi-year programming system. The value of this approach is that it would be
possible to avoid programs that appear to be cost-effective in the short run, yet the
reverse would be true in the long run.
The procurement process itself needs to be reviewed. The system as
described includes a lengthy and laborious tender system, and an equally unwieldy
ordering and payment system. A reengineering approach to process improvement will
help to rid the system of non-value adding activities, while enhancing capacity for the
process to achieve value for money.
Measures taken to address the above problems cannot in themselves yield
desired results, or at least be properly evaluated if the organization is not clear about what
it wants to achieve, and what its priorities are. The absence of equipment establishment
tables is a serious flaw in this respect. This problem can be traced back to ZDF's
planning problems. The broad objectives of the NDP are not clear about the force
structure that ZDF is to adopt. Consequently, the structure is so fluid that planning to
support such a structure is problematic. Despite this problem, a decision to work on
some provisional structure will enable a reasonable start to resource management.
If ZDF's current (peace-time) resource endowment is a reflection of its
war-time logistics capability, then its ability to pass the "staying power test" in a
prolonged limited war is in serious jeopardy. While the NDP analysis asserts that no
such threat currently exists, this may be the opportune time to prepare for the unexpected.
ZDF needs to build-up capability in this respect, and financial constraints dictate that this
be a gradual process. ZDF should therefore establish priorities based on some levels of
readiness. The following process would then be undertaken:
State peace and war-time missions clearly and relate how much of existing
resources are devoted to each mission.
99
Determine levels of readiness based on perceived threat and the capacity to
mobilize resources during conflict escalation.
Determine resources for each level of readiness.
Determine peace-time resource levels such as minimum, intermediate, and
optimal, or whatever nomenclature is preferred.
Care should be taken to balance both peace and war-time requirement
levels to enable ZDF to respond to escalation effectively. Such a system would enable
ZDF to identify mission-related priorities and establish clear milestones to monitor
progress in capability enhancement. Procurement programs would among other
considerations be based on priorities set above. This would also provide credible
justification for financial resources required, as well as provide evidence to civilian
authority of the ZDF's level of readiness to defend Zimbabwe's national interests.
3. Use of Information Technology
ZDF's rudimentary information technology resources are likely to be an
impediment to the modernization process. They are rudimentary in the sense that only a
small proportion of ZDF's processing requirements is catered for. The mainframe
computer system that the ZDF relies on is also on the verge of technological
obsolescence. A handful of PCs available to ZDF are mainly found in offices with
limited processing requirements, and they are used mainly for word processing. The
major focus in utilizing information technology has been on processing the payroll. All
other systems have tended to receive little attention despite the "large unutilized capacity"
ofme mainframe.
The attempt to use the current system for remotely based logistical functions
without affording the units concerned any processing (let alone input) capability is both
inefficient and ineffective. The organization has also failed to capitalize on the system's
potential to process human resources related management information, and this is
manifested in the numerous manual returns Careers Department demands from units
instead of having the information readily available from its management information
system.
ZDF needs to revisit its approach to information technology otherwise its attempt
to achieve efficiency will continue to be elusive. It is important to emphasize that
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technology alone can never be the panacea to modernization and efficiency problems, but
properly implemented, it can make the difference between a successful organization and
a failing one.
Introducing information technology or deciding to change the current system is a
major strategic decision that basically requires answers to self-directed fundamental
questions: "Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there? What are our
missions now and in the future?" The argument in this thesis is that ZDF is certainly far
from where it should be, and needs to develop a strategy consistent with its
modernization vision.
4. Review
The review process is carried out at various stages from the unit to Parliament
level. The main problems with the review process are: focus on expenditure rather than
economy, efficiency and effectiveness; duplication of functions; and ineffective action on
review feedback.
a. Review Focus
Throughout the budgetary process, review activities focus on ensuring that
vote controllers do not exceed their allocations rather than on how economically,
efficiently, and effectively they utilize resources. Control against over-expenditure is
important, but it should go further to ensure that value for money is considered. This, of
course, would be difficult if not impossible where performance parameters are not set.
There is need for ZDF to address this system deficiency to cope with the dwindling
financial resources.
From an audit point of view, only CAG auditors have been engaged in
value for money audits. MOD and ZNA/AFZ internal auditors have yet to develop the
capacity for such audits. Such audits would be most effective if ZDF adopts a
performance focus in managing its resources.
b. Duplication ofFunctions
Functions are duplicated mainly in the review of commitment control (i.e.
Appropriation Account), and in the audit process.
The number of stages where commitment and committed registers are
reviewed is related to the number of stages where they are maintained (i.e. at MOD,
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ZNA/AFZ finance departments, purchasing departments, and vote-controller levels).
There is reason for combining some of the activities to avoid duplication. For example,
combining the vote-control functions of the purchasing and finance departments
effectively eliminates one stage while enhancing efficiency of the process. A process
reengineering approach could help to identify other cases of duplication in the budgetary
process.
There are three major audit organizations (CAG External Audit, and MOD
and ZNA/AFZ Internal Audit Departments), all of which have a mandate to audit public
funds. CAG is Parliament's watchdog and it is from their reports that the public accounts
committee bases its hearings on. The internal audit function is duplicated at the MOD
and ZNA/AFZ level. At this level, the audits are internal to MOD although ZNA and
AFZ departments report to their respective service commanders. The justification for this
is that both commanders account for large sums of public funds and therefore need such
an internal control mechanism. This argument is indeed plausible, in particular because
of the below standard state of accounting in ZDF. Since both concentrate on financial
audits, the effect is to duplicate the function, or where duplication is avoided, their effort
results in wider audit coverage.
Options that could maximize benefit from audit effort need to be
considered. Two examples are given below.
The first option is to have an enlarged audit department at MOD level with
a budget of its own to ensure effectiveness. The department could them be mandated to
conduct both financial and value for money audits. A management consultancy role
could also be assigned to such a department.
The second option is to have MOD internal auditors conduct financial
audits while ZNA/ZFZ internal auditors conduct VFM audits, or vice versa. This
limitation of scope would, however, be inconsistent with the requirements of
International Standards on Internal Auditing to which internal auditors subscribe. MOF
might also disagree with attempts to limit the scope of internal auditors as long as they
are required to report to them.
The above options are given for illustrative purposes. Arguments for and
against the above or any other options can be quite exhaustive, but for the purpose of this
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thesis, it suffices to point out that there are options to finding better ways to reconfigure
the current audit resources to meet the requirements for a performance oriented ZDF.
c. Action on Review Feedback
Effectiveness of the review process depends on timely action in response
to feedback. Two examples, delays in responding to application for virements and failure
to impose effective sanctions in response to violations can be cited.
Virements are applied for when after review of the appropriation account,
it becomes apparent some items are likely to be overspent while others would be
underspent if the expenditure trend remains the same. The virements are authorized at
MOD or Treasury depending on value. Processing of virements is a long, bureaucratic
procedure, and they are confirmed through credit entries on CPO's monthly print-out.
The delays inherent in the process affects planning at lower levels and leads to poor
management of resources.
Violations are often exposed through the audit process. Lack of effective
sanctions (e.g. disciplinary action, dismissal for incompetence) contributes to the
perpetuation of violations. In some cases, officers give little attention to improving
controls despite recommendations by auditors. The audit committee at MOD could be
given more powers to take such substantive action (e.g. to surcharge violators) instead of
merely considering the "effectiveness" of audit responses.
The above analysis of ZDF's budgetary process indicates that
inefficiencies pervade the entire process. ZDF could benefit from the reengineering
approach to process improvement. Reengineering offers the opportunity to progressively
(not incrementally) deal with processes on the basis of established priorities. The final
part of this chapter explores a model that indicates how some of the processes could be
reengineered.
C. A REENGINEERING APPROACH TO PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS
The model presented here illustrates an approach that could be used by ZDF in
improving aspects of its budgetary process. The model is based on a budgetary process
for training stationery for the Zimbabwe Staff College. A relatively simple example has
103





Each process is discussed under two main headings; the current and the
reengineered process. As discussed in Chapter III, reengineering of one process often
affects other processes, which themselves might need reengineering.
1. Allocation Process
a. Current Process
Funds for stationery, like most other items, are allocated on a line-item
basis. There is no specific training budget and neither is allocation made on the basis of
specific missions or programs. Authority to buy stationery and vote-control are
centralized at Army Headquarters, but it has no capacity to effectively monitor the
efficiency in stationery usage. At this level therefore, control is restricted to monitoring
adherence to expenditure targets and ensuring that at the end of the financial year the
allocation is not overspent.
b. Reengineered Process
Allocation is program based. The various courses that are run by ZSC
(Combined Command and Staff Course, Junior Staff Course, and other courses
periodically run by the college) can be classified as specific programs. Allocations for
each of the budget items, stationery being one of them, are classified as program
elements. For ZSC therefore, each of the courses will have an allocation for stationery.
Usage is based on predetermined rates derived from specific exercise
requirements. The review process exposes inefficiency on the part of exercise drafters
where, for example, there is need to reprint of exercises to correct errors, and such errors
exceed the tolerance limits. Stationery usage rates would also be used on the part of
students, and excess requirements would have to be provided by students from their own
resources. ZSC would therefore have effective control focussed not only on the need to
avoid overspending, but on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness in managing the




All units buy their stationery (whether printed or not) from Government
and Printing Stationery Department (GPS). Where GPS is unable to provide the
stationery, it gives units authority to buy from the market.
The order to delivery process involves the foliowing steps:
ZSC sends requirement to DP.
DP checks commitment register. If funds are available, a purchase order is
raised. If funds are not available, unit is advised to seek funds from Finance
Branch. If funds are provided (usually through virement action) unit returns
to DP who raise the purchase order, otherwise ZSC goes without government
purchased stationery.
The unit takes the purchase order to GPS and collects the stationery if
available. If the stationery is not available, the unit obtains authority to buy
from other sources and takes it back to DP for processing. DP processing
involves tender procedures explained in Chapter III, and it may take from
days to weeks before delivery is effected.
b. Reengineered Process
The main features of the reengineered process are the application of
technology and elimination of intermediate processing steps. First, ZDF is linked to its
major and regular suppliers (including GPS) through a computer network (extranet).
Stationery availability at GPS can therefore be verified through the network to avoid
potential waste of time as is the case in the current process.
Second, DP's function is limited to selection and evaluation of contract
suppliers and dealing with reported cases of poor performance, and not the day to day
processing of orders which is left to the unit concerned. The financial control element in
DP which is a duplication of what Finance Branch is mandated to do, is eliminated. The
latter then maintains electronic commitment registers, through which vote-controllers
(linked through intranet) are able to verify balances and make commitments. This also
eliminates the need for the unit to go back and forth between the DP and Finance Brach
84 ADPU is a special case and it is authorized to buy computer stationery.
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to seek funds if the DP commitment register indicates an unfavorable position, and when
Finance Branch approves additional expenditure. The role of Finance Branch in this
case is to facilitate the efficient functioning of the electronic commitment registers, and
using management information to manage the budget efficiently.
Limited approved suppliers are contracted in keeping with contemporary
purchasing philosophy that has proved to be cost effective in terms of cost savings,
quality, and reliability. Related to the DP function of processing tenders and
establishment of contracts, the process could be reengineered by: decentralization ofGTB
functions to MOD, adjusting upwards the tender limits for ZNA and AFZ, establishing
only one secretariat to deal with tender evaluations that exceed ZNA/AFZ limits,
automating as far as possible the evaluation process through tailor-made software.
ZSC can electronically verify stock availability at GPS, check its
uncommitted balance and process its commitment electronically, and proceed to place an
order with any of the approved suppliers in terms of the organizational rules on
purchasing. The unit is therefore able to purchase its stationery with a minimum of effort




There is a long process for effecting payment for goods and services
supplied. On average suppliers are paid sixty days from the date of delivery. The
process involves the following stages:
ZSC certifies and submits copy of original order together with delivery note
and invoices (payment documents) to DP.
DP checks payment documents, makes entries in the commitment registers to
confirm expenditure and passes documents to Finance Branch.
Finance Branch goes through an almost similar process, except that the entries
in the committed registers are made for the first time and passes the document
on to MOD accounts office.
MOD checks the documents, makes entries in their committed registers and
pass to CPO.
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CPO then processes check and sends it to supplier or deposits it in supplier's
account.
b. Reengineered Process
The current process involves a number of non-value adding activities that
could be eliminated through reengineering. As with the order-to-receipt process,
information technology and elimination of non-value adding activities play an important
role in the reengineered process.
In the reengineered process, processing of checks would be decentralized
or
to MOD or even lower levels. No committed registers would be maintained at MOD
level. Payments would be done on a daily basis instead of fortnightly as in the current
process. DP and Finance Branch commitment and committed registers would be
combined into one electronic system to the extent that vote-controllers can effectively
perform their "control" function. DP and Finance Branch would also not handle the
payment documents as these would be directed to the accounts section at MOD or such
other lower level authorized to process payments.
4. Comment
The above model indicates the "radicalism" of the reengineering approach to
improving processes. The benefits in terms of manpower savings and cutting cycle time
are most apparent.
The current system is replete with non-value adding controls whose application is
certainly ineffective. The challenge to the ZDF is its ability to replace these controls with
more skilled manpower, information technology aids, and an ethical culture. A thorough
evaluation of the controls could well prove that they impose a higher cost than the losses
they are supposed to prevent.
While information technology cannot on its own improve processes, its "essential
enabler" role to the reengineering process is evident. In fact some of the intermediate
non-value adding steps would be difficult to eliminate without sacrificing efficiency in
the absence of information technology.
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This depends on government's commitment to decentralization and its preparedness to devolve some of
its cash management responsibilities. ZDF currently operates Imprest Accounts that deal with disbursement
of salaries and travel and subsistence allowances, but payment for all other goods and services is done
through CPO.
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Leadership commitment is indispensable for success of any reengineering
exercise. If ZDF leadership accepts this approach as the way forward, they will have to
deal with very far-reaching changes that involve not only changing internal process, but
influencing change in some external processes as well. The supreme mission to defend
national interests can only be achieved through a capable force, and if radical measures
have to be taken to improve resource planning and management, a persuasive argument




The economic environment within which the ZDF budgetary process operates has
been deteriorating over the years. The Government's expansionary fiscal policies
resulting in an unsustainably high budget deficit among other problems, are blamed for
the poor economic conditions that militate against economic growth. Consequently, there
is a general call for government to reduce its expenditure and improve management of
public resources.
The defense budget is the second largest among the Government's expenditure
programs. Given the relative peace currently prevailing in the region, it is considered by
many as too high to be sustained by Zimbabwe's economy. On the other hand,
government has committed itself to modernizing ZDF to enhance its capability to meet
any threats to Zimbabwe's national interests. Modernizing ZDF would involve
investment in new, technologically advanced equipment and weaponry, and improvement
in associated systems in order to realize optimal returns from such investment. There are
therefore competing expectations on the defense budget; on the one hand there is an
expectation of a "peace dividend" and on the other, an expectation of additional funding
to meet the modernizing program.
ZDF is currently dogged by resource constraints to the extent that there is
constant disruption in its ability to provide some of the basic needs of its soldiers (e.g.
rations, uniforms, medicines), and it cannot engage meaningfully in certain missions (e.g.
training). Despite reduction of the ZNA from 51, 000 to 41, 000 in the hope of applying
the savings from salaries to meet demands for better weaponry, equipment, and
conditions of service in general, there has been an apparent deterioration in the state of
such inventory and conditions of service.
ZDF's problems can be traced back to its formation in 1980. The size of
the army grew from 1 5 000 (former Rhodesian Army strength) to about 70 000 but there
was no corresponding increase in resources. The majority of the force, especially former
guerillas, had not been trained in administration and resource planning and management
in a professional military setting. This resulted in a situation where resources were
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decreasing at an increasing rate, while they were being managed by people ill-trained for
the task of managing them.
The operations that ZDF was engaged in internally and in Mozambique diverted
attention from resource management to operations over a long period to the extent that
MOD received the worst qualifications from the CAG. The de-escalation of conflict in
the early 1990s, however, saw increased attention paid to resource management issues.
Unfortunately, this has not translated into a better situation in terms of resource
availability for the ZDF task. There is even a bigger challenge to enhance capability
through modernization in a deteriorating economic environment. This thesis examined
the budgetary process with a view to suggesting alternatives for improving it to meet
these challenges.
B. POLICY ASPECTS OF DEFENSE BUDGETING
The thesis reviewed theory on policy aspects of defense budgeting. Discussion on
defense policy implications on the budgetary process highlighted the important role that
defense forces play in safeguarding national interests, a role they can only play
effectively if they have the requisite military capability. Military capability involves
readiness (immediate availability of forces to execute their combat missions),
modernization (sophistication of forces' weapon systems and equipment), force structure,
and sustainability (capacity to maintain military forces performing combat missions over
a long period of time). For the purpose of this thesis, modernization assumed a broader
definition to include upgrading of all other systems that would result in enhanced
capability. Achieving capability involves high levels of investment, hence the
inseparability of defense policy from the budget.
The effect of defense expenditure on the economy should be a major concern for
policy makers. There is no consensus on the effect that different levels of expenditure
have on the economy, but it is generally agreed that "too much" or "too little" is harmful
to overall national security interests.
An optimal defense policy would enable the goal of safeguarding national
interests feasible without imposing a crippling burden on the economy. Efficient
resource planning and management based on sound policies can significantly alleviate
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this burden. It is imperative that policy makers in defense should have at their disposal,
capacity to conduct effective policy analysis and evaluation. Such capacity would
involve skilled staff capable of conducting and interpreting economic and other
quantitative analyses, appropriate management information systems, and other resources
necessary to perform the task effectively.
The thesis also reviewed the evolution and pros and cons of the following
budgeting systems: traditional/incremental, ZBB, performance budgeting, PPBS and
MBO. The general shift from the traditional/incremental to other budgeting systems was
prompted mostly by the need to move from a control to a performance focus. The
contemporary systems have a number of common features, in particular the classification
of activities (programs), specification of objectives, and evaluation of efficiency. In
contrast with the traditional/incremental, the contemporary systems are much more
difficult and costly to administer, but it is considered that the benefits outweigh these
shortcomings.
Lessons from government budgetary reforms indicate a general tendency to adopt
"a family of systems" in which selected features from different systems are applied
depending on their relevance and feasibility. Public management problems are, by their
nature, too complex to be solved through the traditional/incremental system. Even non-
traditional systems have to be tailored to the requirements of individual organizations.
PPBS was given more attention in the analysis since it was specifically designed
for the military, and it encompasses most features of other systems designed to improve
efficiency in resource planning and management. As the name implies, PPBS is
conducted in three phases: planning, programming and budgeting.
The planning phase involves identification of national interests, examination of
the international security environment, defining the military strategy, and planning force
structure. The phase culminates in the Secretary of Defense issuing to the services, the
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG guides the services in developing their
programs.
The programming phase translates the DPG into program packages, and is
presented in the form of multi-year financial year plans termed, Program Objective
Memoranda (POM). An elaborate system of reviewing POM and facilitating approval of
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programs by the Defense Resources Planning Board (DRPB) is undertaken and this
provides the basis for the budgeting phase.
The budgeting phase relates POM to financial resources available. The results of
this phase are submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense by the military
department, and to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for incorporation into
the President's Budget. Budget Submitting Offices (BSO) are guided by the Budget
Guidance Manual (BGM) and other issue specific memoranda and notices that may be
issued from time to time.
The PPBS process emphasizes the role of rational analysis to justify programs.
Development of the budget is necessarily an ongoing process that involves planning and
review of plans, developing and evaluating programs, reviewing such programs to take
into account new DPG, and budgeting. It also involves wide consultation within and
outside defense.
C. THE REENGINEERING CONCEPT
The thesis reviewed the concept of process reengineering and how it could help
organizations cope with efficiency problems. It was defined as "the fundamental
rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements
in performance".
Reengineering involves changing management focus from functions to processes.
Reengineered processes are characterized by, among other things, elimination of non-
value adding activities, more staff responsibility (employee empowerment), more
flexibility in responding to the changing environment, reduction in costly controls, and
concern for customers. A major consideration for undertaking reengineering is the desire
to achieve "dramatic" rather than "marginal improvements" in performance. Opportunity
for reengineering manifests itself in what Hammer and Champy termed "broken
processes", "important processes", and "feasible processes".
Success in reengineering depends to a large extent on leadership understanding
the full purport of the reengineering concept, and being committed to see it through
despite hardships that might have to be endured in the process. Information technology is
also critical to the success of reengineering. It is considered as an "essential enabler" to
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the process. The rapid changes in technology pose a great challenge to organizations in
terms of their response not only to keep-up with the changes, but also with the need to
anticipate future changes and position themselves to optimize benefit from such
technology.
The thesis then discussed the application of reengineering to the public sector. As
new management techniques were developed in the private sector, public sector
organizations sought the benefits of improved efficiency by adopting them as well, hence
the adoption ofTQM and reengineering.
The two techniques are complementary, although they differ in their approach in
some respects. Both techniques focus on customer (internal and external) satisfaction,
process improvement, developing human resources, and use of technology. TQM,
however seeks to achieve mostly incremental changes in the entire organization whereas
reengineering seeks "dramatic improvements" and may be implemented on selected
processes in the organization. It was argued that more benefits could be achieved by
introducing the two, although appropriate implementation strategies would be required to
obviate dysfunctional outcomes.
D. ZDF BUDGETARY PROCESS AND THE NEED FOR REENGINEERING
The thesis reviewed and analyzed specific aspects of the ZDF budgetary process
and highlighted areas that need improvement. A reengineering model was presented to
illustrate how some processes with non-value adding activities could be made more
efficient.
The NDP outlines broad objectives for ZDF's role in safeguarding Zimbabwe's
national interests. It reaffirms the Zimbabwe's commitment to have a "well-motivated,
well-trained and well-equipped defense force". This entails large investment
modernizing the ZDF to enhance military capability. At the same time it notes the
economic constraints Zimbabwe is currently facing and the, "need to divert financial
resources (from defense to other sectors of the economy) in order to meet the basic needs
of the people". These seemingly contradictory positions highlight the challenge ZDF
faces in resource mobilization.
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The structure of the ZDF budget is such that most of its funds go towards salaries.
The balance is hardly adequate to fund programs to improve resource availability. In the
absence of additional funding, the solution lies in revising force structure and improving
resource planning and management.
The ZDF budgetary process works within the regulatory framework of
Government's budgetary system. Parliament determines government appropriations while
MOF is responsible for the "management and control of public moneys and state
property". The Ministry of Defense, as with all other ministries, is bound to operate
within the framework of the Treasury managed system which is characterized by
centralization, inflexibility, and a predominantly control orientated focus.
Budgetary reforms initiated by Government determine reforms in the ZDF
budgetary process. Recent reforms include introduction of the three-year rolling budget
system and expenditure controls in the form of expenditure targets and the "stop-
payment" system. The changes were motivated by the need to improve planning and
cash management. Instead of waiting for government initiated reforms, ZDF's peculiar
needs dictate that it evolves internal budget reforms to meet the challenges of ever
diminishing resources and the NDP-endorsed need to modernize.
Discussion of ZDF's budgeting policy framework highlighted the need for policy
analysis and evaluation, setting of clear objectives, an effective budgeting system, and
prospects under the three-year rolling budget.
It is inappropriate for ZDF to continue basing its decision making on an
"intuitive" rather than a rational decision making process. It was argued that the former
manifests itself in ZDF commitment to unsustainable projects, ineffectiveness in
justifying defense requirements, and a perception among its members of a general lack or
direction. Current constraints in adopting this approach to decision making include, lack
of skilled human resource base (to conduct and interpret quantitative economic and other
analyses), poor records management, and insufficient information technology resources.
Political, financial, and other considerations could also threaten adoption or effectiveness
of this approach. Adoption of this approach needs to be preceded by a strategic planning
process to maximize benefit.
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It was noted that NDP objectives are too broad upon which to base specific
programs. There are other problems with ZDF's objective setting process and they
include failure to link mission and objectives with the budget, absence of specific
program objectives linked with appropriate funding, and poor consultation.
The effectiveness of ZDF's budgetary process is constrained mostly by its
incremental approach and basis on line-items rather than on programs or missions. The
incremental approach focuses on control rather than performance. ZDF is in the process
of evolving "Defense Management Planning" and "Programming" systems, and a
Director General of Programs was appointed to steer introduction of the systems in the
organization. This thesis does not base its arguments on these developments since they
are not fully operational and cannot therefore, be evaluated effectively.
A Treasury circular calling for estimates from all ministries and providing
indicative figures of the amount likely to be allocated triggers the budget formulation
process. MOD in turn calls for estimates from department heads in MOD and from the
service commanders. Unlike in the PPBS model discussed in this thesis, "planning
guidance" or "budget guidance" is not provided to align the requirements from various
departments for optimal allocation of resources.
Very little attention is given to revenue budgeting in the ZDF. This could be due
to lack of incentive since there are no clear performance parameters for revenue budgets,
and no funds directly connected with such revenue are channeled back to the source
units. The Defense Procurement Fund provides such an opportunity at the HQ level, and
lower levels could similarly benefit. This is likely to improve resource planning and
management in general.
The negotiation process effectively starts at Army and Air HQ levels. There is
very little consultation with or at lower levels of the organization. The survey conducted
among ZDF officers reveals that lower levels are in most cases not even given the
opportunity to justify their requirements. Perhaps the gap between requirements and
what authorities are prepared to recommend as estimates is too great to render negotiation
worthwhile.
Parliamentary involvement in the negotiation process occurs when the
Appropriation Bill is presented to the house for debate. The Minister of Defense is
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responsible for steering the defense portion of the estimates in Parliament and justifying
them to the legislators. Legislators tend to be more concerned with the level of spending
relative to other government programs, and MOD's problems in accounting for previous
appropriations, rather than with specific programs that MOD proposes.
Most problems in the budgetary process become apparent at the implementation
stage. Analysis of implementation was presented in the form of specific ZNA cases to
illustrate the general nature of problems in the budgetary process. The major issues are
summarized below.
Pay and Records. This case focused on management decisions on staffing and
application of information technology. Primary observations from the case are as
follows:
Despite the fact that the major part of ZNA's budget is committed to salaries
and allowances, the attention that was paid to the needs of this system did not
reflect that fact.
Determination of the level of staffing was arbitrary rather than being based on
job evaluation. The benefits of information technology (particularly saving
manpower) were taken for granted and this resulted in the perpetuation of
inefficiencies.
Certain tasks in ZDF can be performed by civilian staff or can be out-sourced
to save manpower for traditional military functions.
Lack of an information technology strategy results in adoption of sub-optimal
systems. For example, the pay and records system suffers from over-
centralization, lack of proper integration, and poor responsiveness to changes
in technology. Consequently, the system has several non-value adding
activities and quality of service is compromised.
Purchasing Cycle. The purchasing cycle is governed by government tender rules
and the steps involved in the system are also determined by the number of departments
that play a role if the cycle. In this case it is the user-department, DP, Finance Branch,
MOD (GTC, Accounts Office), GTB, and CPO. Major observations are given below:
The decisions on advertising and award of formal tenders for all government
departments and certain levels of tenders for government enterprises are
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centralized at GTB. This results in a lengthy processing cycle and delays in
award of tenders.
While the "Rules for the Procurement of Goods and Services" emphasize the
need to procure goods and services with "a maximum of economy and
efficiency", in practice emphasis is on "cheapest quote". There is apparent
lack of technical capacity to evaluate quality in most cases.
Lack of information technology to assist in evaluation of tenders,
communication, and general procurement administration hinders efficiency.
Poor financial management systems contribute to inefficiency. For example,
officers are reluctant to propose delivery schedules to suppliers for future
purchases because funds available at the time the decision is made might not
be available when delivery becomes due, yet such an arrangement could make
it more efficient for suppliers to meet ZDF's needs at lower prices
All payments are centralized at CPO. This, the tender system, and number of
stages involved in the "order-to-delivery" and "receipt-to-payment" process
result in non-value adding departments and activities, (e.g. The vote-control
section in DP, current expenditure section in Finance Branch, and the
accounts office at MOD basically perform the same function on the same
documentation and data.)
The functions or processes in the departments involved in the cycle are quite
amenable to application of information technology. Information technology
resources could obviate the number of stages in the cycle, speed up processes
and realize significant manpower savings.
The "stop-payment" control system comes into effect after financial
commitment would have been made. Failure to enforce commitment control
led to additional controls being instituted instead of dealing with the
transgressors. The problem was shifted to suppliers who now have to endure
delays in settlement of their bills, and there can be no guessing that they pass
on the costs of such inefficiencies to government through their pricing
systems.
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Human Resources. The amount that ZDF spends on salaries, and the need to
motivate members as part of enhancing defense capability, merits more attention on
human resource management practices. The general observations are as follows:
The savings in salaries arising from downsizing need to be properly evaluated
and applied to specific programs otherwise they could just fall victim of
inefficiencies in the system, and intended benefits would not be realized.
ZDF needs to keep track of training and development costs and if this is done
within the framework of a program or mission based system, it would be
easier to monitor relative efficiencies or cost effectiveness among training
programs, or to structure programs that are more cost-effective.
There is need to conduct a skills inventory to determine training needs, evolve
cost-effective methods for meeting those needs, and ensure that placement
maximizes return from such training investment.
Research based training could help inculcate a research culture among
officers, and when properly reinforced by the organization, could realize
invaluable contribution to management in the ZDF.
Human resources management practices were identified as an area that needs
to be improved. Such issues as consistency in promotion policy, equal
selection opportunities, recognition of seniority, and performance appraisal
were specifically identified.
Deterioration in conditions of service affect motivation and morale. The
likely compromise on readiness is undesirable and negates the effort to
modernize ZDF.
There is lack of equity in conditions of service resulting from resource
constraints, (e.g. family accommodation is provided in some units and not in
others, subsistence and travel allowances are mostly paid to senior ranks only
and not to some junior ranks travelling with them, soldiers in some units
contribute to welfare funds and these funds are used to subsidize government
funds to pay for such things as minor vehicle repairs, fuel, rations etc.)
The spin-off effect of good human resource management is that professional
and motivated staff is likely to manage other resources well.
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Materiel Resources. The following problems were identified:
Absence of establishment tables showing what equipment and in what
quantities each unit is entitled to. Such tables could be based on different
levels of resource allocation that would be required to respond to different
situations.
Absence of a multi-year planning and programming system for equipment
procurement. There is, however, progress in this direction.
Absence of a "cradle to grave" management policy and life cycle costing.
Emphasis on line-item budgeting and absence of performance criteria to
measure efficiency in resource procurement and utilization.
Failure to conduct economic analyses to determine appropriate levels of
service support (e.g. spares, maintenance and fuel) for the equipment.
Poor management controls resulting in inefficient and ineffective use, and
misuse or abuse of resources.
The nature of decision making required for management of such resources,
and the sheer volume of transactions make it imperative to employ
information technology extensively.
Information Technology. The need to take advantage of information technology
pervades the budgetary process as observations made so far confirm. Other general
observations are noted below.
ZDF is still in an era of mainframe-based computing and lags behind many
organizations in this respect.
It has yet to cease the opportunities of global communication trends such as
intranet, extranet, internet, and electronic mail.
A comprehensive information technology strategy is required to cope with the
large capital investment that would be required to automate most of its
processes and the rapid changes occurring in the technology world.
The review stage in the budgetary process involves a number of stages that
require reconciliation due to items in transit. Like the purchasing cycle, it also has a
number of non-value adding stages, a problem resulting from placing management focus
on functions rather than processes.
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At the audit level, the need to enhance capacity to conduct value for money audits
is consistent with the performance forecast that this thesis urges. Restructuring the audit
function within MOD also merits attention, particularly with a view to streamlining
reporting procedures, and introducing a consultancy function.
Survey results validate the concerns about the budgetary process raised in this
thesis. It is clear that key stakeholders (i.e. legislators and officers directly involved in
the budgetary process) are concerned with the lack of effective consultation in the
process. The merit of addressing this concern lies in the logic of getting key stakeholders
on board to support programs critical to the organization's mission.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis attempted to provide a realistic analysis of the ZDF budgetary process.
The process is in serious need of improvements if it is to sustain ZDF's capability to
perform its ultimate mission - safeguarding Zimbabwe's national security interests. The
pervasive nature of problems in the budgetary process makes it imperative to adopt
recommendations at a strategic level rather than mere itemization of individual problems
identified. This thesis therefore recommends as follows:
ZDF should argue for inclusion of defense issues in national development
planning as a way of establishing at the planning level, the inevitable link
between the defense effort and the economy. All stakeholders, including civil
society, should have the opportunity to provide input to national defense
policy and assert their role in contributing to national defense. Such an
approach would have more chances of success if preceded by a public
relations effort that would educate the public about the ZDF's real constraints
in safeguarding national interests.
ZDF should adopt reforms that incorporate aspects of program and mission-
based budgeting systems. The new system would be based on clear
objectives, rational policy analysis and evaluation in the decision making
process, and it would enable ZDF to evaluate performance on the basis of
inputs and outcomes of programs related to military missions.
Implementation would, however, need to be preceded by an intensive program
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to develop appropriate capacity to avoid a "false start". Missions and
performance standards and methods must first be developed.
ZDF should seek the benefits of the strategic planning process and inculcate a
strategic planning culture among its department heads and commanders at all
levels. This would enable the organization to anticipate problems well in
advance and respond appropriately.
ZDF should evolve an information technology strategy to automate most of its
processes, otherwise it will continue to need a lot manpower to perform tasks
whose value is not commensurate with the investment in such human
resources. Best results are "guaranteed" if implemented together with other
management techniques (e.g. TQM, reengineering, and good human resource
practices).
The prevalence of non-value adding activities in the budgetary process, and
some evidently "broken down" processes (e.g. soldiers' personal funds used to
subsidize government finances) call for "dramatic improvements". Process
reengineering is an effective and appropriate technique that ZDF should use to
deal with such problems.
All recommendations, no matter how laudable, cannot be effectively
implemented if the human resource base is uncertain. There is need for ZDF
to continue to improve its human resource base to keep up with changes in
organizational (and business) practices and technology. A skills inventory
needs to be conducted and a strategy to deal with deficiencies evolved.
Measures should be taken to check the continued deterioration in the quality
of working life ofZDF personnel.
F. FURTHER RESEARCH
This study reviewed the ZDF budgetary process in its broadest context. It lays the
groundwork for understanding the system as a basis for more detailed study on specific
issues. One area that could benefit from such study involves econometric analysis of the
impact of current defense expenditures on Zimbabwe's economy, and how various levels
of modernization expenditure over different periods of time in the future would also
121
impact on the economy. The "value of security" could be factored-in, and suggestions for
optimal levels of expenditure, consistent with maintaining military capability without
jeopardizing economic security, should be made.
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